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Pravica do samoodločbe kot izziv za sodobno Evropo 
Ta teza bo obravnavala sodoben pomen pravice do samoodločbe in uresničevanje omenjene 
pravice, zlasti v okviru enostranske odcepitve. Najvidnejši primer te je bila enostransko 
razglašena neodvisnost Kosova od Srbije, ki se je zgodila februarja 2008. Glavni cilj teze je 
raziskati, ali ta dogodek lahko označimo kot prelomnico pravice do samoodločbe in kakšne 
učinke lahko ta primer nosi za Evropo v prihodnosti. Ključna ugotovitev te raziskave je, da je 
bil primer na Kosovu kar se tiče pravice do samoodločbe precedens z globokimi in 
dolgoročnimi posledicami, ki je že vzbudil in bo tudi v prihodnosti vzbudil veliko 
odcepitvenih gibanj znotraj Evrope. Druga ugotovitev je, da je uspeh enostranske izjave o 
neodvisnosti odvisen predvsem od odziva mednarodne skupnosti, ki bodisi novo ozemlje v 
njegovih prizadevanjih da postane država podpre, ali ne. Različne reakcije v podobnih 
situacijah potrjujejo, da je potrebno enotno pravilo, ki se ga naj uporablja za vse primere, brez 
dvojnih standardov in arbitrarnosti.  
Ta precedens bi lahko imel v prihodnosti resne posledice za Evropo. Če se bo ta trend 
„balkanizacije“ še naprej širil v Evropo, se bo zemljevid Evrope v naslednjih letih dramatično 
spremenil. To lahko privede ne samo do politične nestabilnosti, marveč tudi do oboroženih 
spopadov med odcepitvenimi gibanji in centralno oblastjo. 
Ključne besede: samoodločba, secesija, Evropa, Kosovo 
 
The right to self-determination as a challenge to modern Europe 
This thesis will discuss the contemporary meaning of the right to self-determination and 
practicing of this right, particularly in the context of unilateral secession. The most prominent 
example of such claim was the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo from Serbia in 
February 2008. The main goal of the thesis is to research if this event can be the turning point 
for the right to self-determination and what effects on Europe this precedent might have in 
the future. The key finding of the research is that the Kosovo case was a precedent with 
profound and long-term repercussions on the right to self-determination in general, and it 
raised, and will be raising many secessionist movements in Europe. Another finding is that 
the success of a unilateral declaration of independence mainly depends on the reaction of the 
international community which will, or will not support a new territory in its efforts to 
become a state. A different reaction in similar situations confirms that we need a uniformed 
rule applicable to all cases, without double standards and arbitrariness.  
This precedent could have serious repercussions on Europe in the future. If this trend of 
„balkanization“ continues spreading across Europe, the map of Europe will change 
dramatically in the following years, and it can lead not only to political instability, but also to 
armed conflict between secessionist movements and central authorities. 
Keywords: self-determination, secessionism, Europe, Kosovo 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1950, the United Nations (UN) consisted only of 60 member states. Eleven years later, in 
1961, there were 104 UN member states, while in 1968, that number raised to 126 member 
states (United Nations, n.d.). Today, there are 193 UN member states. It means that in the last 
69 years, we got 133 new countries in the world, which are almost two new countries each 
year. And these are only fully recognized countries – besides these countries, we have dozens 
of disputed territories across the world, which aspire to become UN member states. 
Unresolved issues of self-determination all across Europe are one of the greatest challenges 
of European politics today, and it will be especially challenging in the times to come. Various 
groups claim their right to self-determination, but the problem is to determine which of those 
groups had the actual right in this context, outside of the widely accepted, decolonization 
process.  
The right to self-determination was originally provided as a right of peoples under colonial 
rule, but in the period after World War II this term gets a new, broader meaning. Peoples and 
minorities all across the world aspire for their right to self-determination, through autonomy 
or even unilateral secession - which conflicts with the sovereignty and territorial  
integrity of the parent state (Walter, von Ungern-Sternberg, & Abushov, 2014, p. 1).  
„Self-determination conflicts are among the most persistent and destructive forms of warfare. 
Given the structural inequality between an armed self-determination movement and the 
opposing central government, the ’national liberation movement’ will often resort to irregular 
methods of warfare, possibly including terrorist tactics“ (Weller, 2009, p. 13). Violence is 
increasing, and all this leads to long-term destabilization of the region. 
The tipping point for the right of self-determination in a modern sense was the unilateral 
declaration of independence of Kosovo from Serbia on 17 February 2008. We will investigate 
is the unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in accordance with the right of self-
determination, and is the Kosovo case a precedent for other territories who want to gain their 
independence.  
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Currently, on the European continent, there are many secessionist movements which are 
seeking for their right to self-determination. However, not all of them are entitled to it. Who 
is entitled to the right to self-determination, i.e., what constitutes a „people“, what are 
conditions for that right, and what repercussions such actions might have on Europe – these 
are thesis’ main focuses. 
In order to research those focuses, after giving short historical, and theoretical background 
about this phenomenon, the case of Kosovo will be analyzed, together with another famous 
secessionist territory in Europe – Catalonia. After a short comparison of two cases, our focus 
will be on future hotspots in Europe and how that can affect the future political landscape of 
the European continent. 
1.1 Research questions 
The thesis will discuss the right to self-determination of the peoples, with the special focus on 
unilateral declarations of independence, i.e., separation without consent of the parent state.  
There are many territories in Europe which have secessionist tendencies. Usually, those 
separatist movements start as a minor group of enthusiasts, but after the repression of a 
central government, they grow fast.  Encouraged by relatively successful examples of 
secessions, they want to find their way to the path of independence.  
This master thesis will have two main research questions, both regarding Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008. Those research questions are: 
Is the case of Kosovo a precedent for other territories which want to gain independence?  
What are possible repercussions of Kosovo case in the European context? 
1.2 Methods of research 
Research methods that will be used in this master thesis are descriptive method and method 
of secondary analysis - for the theoretical background, literature review and selected cases; 
case study method for presenting the cases of Kosovo and Catalonia, and comparative 
method for comparing the Catalan case with the case of Kosovo. 
For the literature review, we will be primarily using authors from Europe’s most prominent 
universities, such as Oxford, Cambridge, Maastricht, Louvain, etc. in order to get the most 
precise and most objective answers for our field of interest. We will be also using the relevant 
sources from the author’s speaking area, because many topics we will be discussing are 
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closely related to the region of former Yugoslavia. Because of the nature of the phenomenon, 
beside of analysis from political science and international relations lens - a lot of legal 
documents will be examined and quoted – international conventions granting the right of self-
determination, advisory opinions, constitutions, declarations, etc. Also, acts of territories and 
states, and statements of their officials will be examined in this study. They are mostly 
obtained through relevant news articles, in order to get the most comprehensive insight into 
the practical exercise of this right. 
The case study method will allow us to take a closer look at our research problem, in order to 
better understand the specific context of it. It will help us explore the Kosovo and Catalonia 
cases through analysis of many events which preceded and followed unilateral declarations of 
independence.  
Using a comparative method of social sciences, Catalonia and Kosovo cases will be 
compared. The goal is to draw similarities and differences between these two cases, and to 
find out why, although both territories attempted to break away from a unitary country, 
Kosovo had a (relatively) successful story, and Catalonia did not. 
Finally, we will use a descriptive method in order to point out territories across Europe which 
may become hotspots for escalation of separatism in the future, and to make the final 
conclusion regarding our research questions. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured out of eleven chapters. 
In the first, introductory part, general ideas about which we will be discussing in the thesis 
are given, together with research questions, methods of research and structure of the thesis. 
Chapter two will cover the right to self-determination, starting from the brief historical 
development of the right, implementation of the proclaimed right in major international 
documents, to the meaning of this right in both traditional - decolonization context, and 
contemporary understanding of this right. Further will be explained terms of internal and 
external self-determination, as two ways of exercising this right. In the final subchapter of 
this part, we will look for the answer to the question who are the “peoples” who can pursue 
the right to self-determination. 
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The most significant and therefore the most comprehensive chapter of the theoretical part of 
the thesis is the third chapter. It will cover the topic of secession, primarily unilateral. We 
will find out does international law prohibit unilateral declarations of independence, what is a 
position of national law in this regard, and whether the principle of territorial integrity is in 
conflict with secession. Finally, elements of a country, recognition and border issues will be 
clarified.   
The topic about which neither theory nor practice is unanimous - remedial right to secession, 
will be explained in the next, fourth chapter of the thesis.  
Chapter five will discuss the case study of Kosovo, one of the most prominent examples of 
unilateral secession in the world. Starting from a brief historical introduction, the unilateral 
declaration of independence of Kosovo will be examined from both international and national 
law perspective. The day of declaration, reactions of the parent state Serbia and international 
community; the legal struggle of Serbia and the Advisory opinion of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) regarding Kosovo’s declaration of independence, will be discussed in this 
chapter. Relying on the literature from the previous chapters, we will take a look to Kosovo 
secession in the aspect of the actual right to secede and fulfilling conditions for secession, 
particularly in the context of remedial secession. International reaction to Kosovo statehood, 
Kosovo’s aspirations to join the UN and the EU, relations with the parent state Serbia, the 
dialogue of Belgrade and Pristina will be also in focus in the chapter. Finally, we will explain 
the current situation on Kosovo, and try to conclude what are possible options for the final 
settlement for Kosovo. 
After that, the case of Catalonia will be explained in the sixth chapter. From the historical 
overview, to the Catalan crisis in 2017, this chapter should provide insight into the situation 
of this historical region in the northeastern corner of the Iberian Peninsula. 
In chapter seven, we will compare the Catalan case with the case of Kosovo and draw 
parallels between these two cases. Both entities unilaterally declared independence from their 
parent states, but yet, Kosovo and Catalonia had utterly different outcomes.  
In this section, we will analyze what are the differences and similarities between these two 
cases, and what conclusion we can make from the comparison of these two cases. 
Chapter eight is dedicated to new breakaway territories which are about to emerge on the 
European continent in the following years. We will take a short glance on current situations 
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in Scotland, Northern Ireland, Republic of Srpska, Catalonia, Basque, and Flanders. These 
regions have a high probability of becoming independent countries within the next decade. 
The eleventh chapter contains final remarks, answers to the research questions, and the final 
conclusion of the research. 
After it, in chapter ten, the abstract of the thesis in Slovenian language is given, followed by 
last, eleventh part, with the list of references used in the thesis. 
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2 THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
2.1 Beginnings of the right 
The right to self-determination has changed throughout history, during which peoples all 
across the world often rebelled against foreign rule, freely determining, before all, their 
political status. Historical examples would be the liberation of former British colonies in 
North America or decolonization of Latin-American countries. This process can be opposite 
as well - in the direction of unification, like in cases of the unification of Germany, or Italy, 
in the nineteenth century. The first and basic principles of this right evolved from the 
American Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution. Since then, the idea of 
self-determination was the main motive for the most uprisings against great empires during 
the history, such as Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Ottoman Empire etc. During World 
War I, the right to self-determination has been offered “as a basis for a future peace 
settlement and a new world order, by both leaders of the Russian Revolution and the US 
President Woodrow Wilson.” (Wolfrum & Philipp, 1995, p. 1171) “The right gained 
international prominence in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Since then it has had a 
tumultuous existence, ranging from post-World War decolonization to post-Cold War ethnic 
conflicts.” (Borgen, 2007, p. 482) 
The right to self-determination is implemented in many important international acts. This 
right is declared in the UN Charter. In the very first article of the Chapter, it is said that the 
purpose of the UN is, among others, to “develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace” (UN Charter, 1945) 
An important document for this subject is Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, which proclaimed “the necessity of bringing to a speedy and 
unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations” by declaring that “all 
peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (UN 
Resolution 1514, 1960) which was, with the exact words, confirmed six years later in article 
1 of both, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
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2.2 The right to self-determination today 
“The general view is that separation from a state as a method of self-determination is a 
legally-sanctioned solution only in the context of decolonization.” (Borgen, 2007, p.485) 
“During the decolonisation period, the right of self-determination was recognised as the right 
to become free from colonial rule (and extended to cover peoples under foreign occupation or 
racist regimes).” (Kohen, 2006, p. 357) 
However, van den Driest (2013, p.3) thinks that beyond decolonization, this right continued 
to exist. Today it does not just represent a right of colonial peoples, but the right of all 
peoples. This right today has two dimensions: the internal and the external dimension. 
The internal dimension of self-determination suggests that this right should be implemented 
within the existing country, in relations between a country and its population. 
The external dimension of self-determination was dominant during the decolonization period 
after World War II. “Beyond the context of decolonization, it is accepted that the right to 
external self-determination may be exercised through the peaceful dissolution of a State, 
through consensual merger or (re)union with another State, or through consensual or 
constitutional secession.” (ibid) 
In the following paragraphs, we will be discussing the scope of the right to self-determination 
outside of the decolonization context, and who is entitled to it. 
2.2.1 Internal self-determination 
It is a common misconception that right to self-determination always implies secession. 
There are different forms and degrees of this term. Buchanan (1992, p. 351) emphasizes that 
“exercising the right of self-determination need not always involve secession if other degrees 
and forms of self-determination are available.” 
Borgen (2007, pp. 483-485) supports this view, and explains it furthermore: 
The concept of self-determination is actually comprised of two distinct subsidiary parts. The 
default rule is “internal self-determination”, which is essentially the protection of minority 
rights within a state. As long as a state provides a minority group the ability to speak their 
language, practice their culture in a meaningful way, and effectively participate in the 
political community, then that group is said to have internal self-determination.” Therefore, 
“the assumption is that such a pursuit of economic, social, and cultural development would 
occur under the auspices of an existing state, and would not require the establishment of a 
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new state. This conception of internal self-determination makes self-determination closely 
related to the respect of minority rights.  
Therefore, interstate autonomy would be a suitable solution for national minorities who are 
seeking for their cultural, social and economic rights. But that pursuit should be only within 
the parent state. The main assumption is that practicing such rights do not require creating a 
new country, but can be exercised within an existing country.  
Some liberal views of this right also recognize the federalist option as a model of practicing 
internal self-determination.  (ibid, p. 485) 
2.3 Peoples 
Originally, the right to self-determination was declared as a right for those peoples who are 
under colonial rule, foreign occupation or some other forms of domination in their land. So, 
during the decolonization period, this definition of “peoples” was fairly simple and 
straightforward. 
After World War II, the international community is trying to extend this right outside the 
original context of decolonization, but due to the absence of clear legal framework, there is 
no precise position on the issue who has the right to self-determination.  
 “However, certain peoples have been conferred a positive entitlement. Such a right 
unquestionably exists today in favor of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to 
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” (International Law MOOC, 2017b). 
That was said in the Advisory opinion in respect of Kosovo: “During the second half of the 
twentieth century, the international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to 
create a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples 
subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” (Accordance with International 
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo [hereinafter Kosovo 
advisory opinion], 2010, par. 79) 
Non-self-governing territories are “territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full 
measure of self-government” (UN Charter, art. 73) According to the United Nations, there are 
17 non-self-governing territories at the moment, among them Gibraltar, Western Sahara, 
Falkland Islands. (United Nations, 2019).  
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The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States (1970) confirms this: “The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-
Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of 
the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist 
until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of 
self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and 
principles.“ 
Thus, there are no disputes over this issue in the international community - peoples under 
colonial rule or in non-self-governing territory always have the right to self-determination.  
But can minorities within one country claim their right to self-determination? Answer for this 
question can be found in the opinion 2 of Badinter Commission, the arbitration commission 
of the Conference on Yugoslavia. The question put by Serbia was “Does the Serbian 
population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one of the constituent peoples of 
Yugoslavia, have the right to self-determination?” (Pellet, 1992). 
The Arbitration Committee was of the opinion (ibid) 
that the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is entitled to all the rights 
concerned to minorities and ethnic groups under international law and under the provisions of 
the draft Convention of the Conference on Yugoslavia of 4 November 1991, to which the 
Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have undertaken to give effect; and that the 
Republics must afford the members of those minorities and ethnic groups all the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms recognized in international law, including, where appropriate, the 
right to choose their nationality. 
The conclusion is that minorities can have all the rights reserved for minorities, but not the 
right to self-determination, in the context of secession. They can exercise their right to self-
determination in the form of internal self-determination.  
However, in very exceptional cases, even “external” self-determination i.e. secession is 
possible for minorities. These are situations such as massive breaches of international law. 
UN study (Cristescu & United Nations, 1981, para. 173) says: 
The principle of equal rights and self-determination ... does not grant an unlimited right of 
secession to populations living in the territory of an independent sovereign state ... The right 
of secession unquestionably exists, however, in a special, but very important case: that of 
peoples, territories and entities subjugated in violation of international law. In such cases, the 
peoples have the right to regain their freedom and constitute themselves and independent 
sovereign states. 
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3 SECESSION 
Term secession usually has a negative connotation, associating with unilateral rebellion 
against mother state, but it is originally a more neutral term. A definition of secession is “the 
action of withdrawing formally from membership of a federation or body, especially a 
political state.” (Oxford dictionaries, n.d.) Therefore, secession also can be done through a 
“concerted and negotiated process with the mother state” (International Law MOOC, 2017a). 
Prof. Pierre d’Argent further explains by giving an example where “South Sudan declared its 
independence in 2011 following an internationally monitored referendum, that had been 
agreed after the lengthy and bloody civil war”. South Sudan was easily recognized by the 
international community as an independent state and has become the 193rd UN member state 
country.  
On the other hand, Kohen (2006, p. 3) has a different, more restricted view of the term, 
claiming that “secession is the creation of a new independent entity through the separation of 
part of the territory and population of an existing State, without the consent of the latter.” As 
we see, he emphasizes that disagreement of the parent state, as a necessary element of the 
definition. In this thesis, for the situation described above, we will use the term unilateral 
secession. 
3.1 Unilateral secession 
 “Throughout history, many new states came to exist as a result of unilateral acts of 
secession.” (International Law MOOC, 2017a) The questions we will cover in this subchapter 
are the legality of these actions under international law, as well as under the domestic law of 
the parent state. 
Van den Driest (2013, p. 4) states that: 
International law does not explicitly acknowledge this mode of exercising the right to self-
determination. In fact, unilateral secession seems to be irreconcilable with the fundamental 
position within the international legal order of the principle of respect for the territorial 
integrity of States, which is aimed at maintaining the territorial status quo of sovereign States, 
while (unilateral) secession is precisely aimed at territorial change by modifying the external 
boundaries of the existing State.  
Nevertheless, many territories across the world unilaterally declared their independence from 
the parent state. But did they violate the international law and territorial integrity of mother 
country by doing such unilateral act?  
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3.1.1 International law perspective 
The answer to the question “Does international law prohibits unilateral declarations of 
independence?” is provided in the International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) advisory 
opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence, which will be discussed in more details 
later on, in a separate chapter dedicated to the Kosovo case. In brief, Kosovo unilaterally 
declared independence from Serbia in 2008, and Serbia asked the advisory opinion from ICJ 
regarding this unilateral secession. 
The exact question for the Court was: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international 
law?” (Kosovo advisory opinion, 2010) 
ICJ did not decide on merits regarding the right to self-determination, claiming “issues 
relating to the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence of any right of 
‘remedial secession’ are beyond the scope of the question posed by the General Assembly” 
but rather decided on the formal basis where “General international law contains no 
applicable prohibition of declarations of independence ⎯ Declaration of independence of 17 
February 2008 did not violate general international law” (Kosovo advisory opinion, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the advisory opinion clearly said that unilateral secession per se is not 
prohibited by general international law. This might sound illogical since “international law 
protects the territorial integrity of the states” (International Law MOOC, 2017a) which is 
written in the UN Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” (Charter of the 
United Nations, art. II, §4) 
As we can see from the quotation, this applies to all “members” (of the United Nations), 
which implies that this does not apply for the territory separating in the moment of secession, 
but only for the future, fully recognized countries. This was stated by the ICJ in the Kosovo 
advisory opinion (2010), under paragraph 80: “the scope of the principle of territorial 
integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States.” Professor d’Argent 
(International Law MOOC, 2017a) explains this as understandable, because otherwise  
the establishment of any new state would be contrary to international law and could not be 
recognized by other states. Then the composition of the international community of states 
would be frozen forever. The power of existing states on their people would be considerably 
reinforced because the creation of any new state would need to be concerted which would 
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amount to giving to the mother state an unlimited veto to the emergence of a new state on a 
portion of its territory.  
Although we see that unilateral declarations of independence per se did not violate general 
international law, this does not mean that every unilateral secession is legal within 
international law. In other words, this does not mean that every territory has the right under 
international law to secede and declare independence, although that declaration will not 
violate international law. So, “there is indeed a difference between having a right to do 
something, and simply having a possibility, the freedom to do it“ (International Law MOOC, 
2017b). That was explicitly stated in the Advisory opinion, paragraph 56: “it is entirely 
possible for a particular act — such as a unilateral declaration of independence — not to be in 
violation of international law without necessarily constituting the exercise of a right conferred 
by it.” (Kosovo advisory opinion, 2010) 
For example, there are cases where secession is a result of great breaches of international law, 
e.g. “illegal use of force by another state, helping the secession – and that was the case of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus“ (International Law MOOC, 2017a), and it is clear that 
there is no right to secession in those scenarios.  
3.1.2 National law perspective 
We should also take into consideration the national law of the parent state.  
This differs depending if the country is federal or unitary. Federal countries are more likely to 
have a provision granting the right to self-determination in the context of secession rather 
than unitary countries. However, not all federal countries have such provision, e.g. Germany 
is a federal country, but does not provide an option in its constitution for a federal state to 
secede.  
On the other hand, the Constitution of the Soviet Union (1977) had an article regarding the 
right of the member republics to secede. In the article 72, it is said that “Each Union Republic 
shall retain the right freely to secede from the USSR.” A similar provision existed in the 
introductory part of the SFRY Constitution (1974). Also, the Constitutional Charter of Serbia 
and Montenegro (2003) provided an exit option for a member state of the confederation 
which wants to leave the state union. In the article 60, it is said that after 3 years, member-
states have the right to start the procedure for changing state status, i.e. to leave from the state 
union of Serbia and Montenegro, after the referendum. And so it was, Montenegro held an 
independence referendum on 21 May 2006, where people voted independence with 55,5% of 
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voters, passing 55% threshold by only a half percent (BBC, 2006). Serbia accepted the results 
and formally recognized Montenegro on 15 June 2006. (B92, 2006) This is how it works in 
federal countries where the right to secession is foreseen in advance by the federal 
constitution. 
However, situations in unitary states are different. Since we will be discussing about the cases 
of Kosovo and Catalonia, for this example we will use Serbian and Spanish constitutions. 
In the very beginning of Serbian constitution (2006), it is stated that “the Province of Kosovo 
and Metohija is an integral part of the territory of Serbia, that it has the status of a substantial 
autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia and that from such status of the Province of 
Kosovo and Metohija follow constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and 
protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign 
political relations” (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 2006, pmbl.) and in article 8 that 
“the territory of the Republic of Serbia is inseparable and indivisible.” 
The highest legal act of Spain states that “national sovereignty belongs to the Spanish people, 
from whom all State powers emanate." (Spanish constitution, 1978, art. I, § 2) and claims that 
is “based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible 
homeland of all Spaniards; it recognises and guarantees the right to self-government of the 
nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” 
(Spanish constitution, 1978, art. II, § 1) 
Consequently, there is no legal option for secession in these countries. Every attempt to 
secession would be in violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the mother country. 
3.2 Territorial integrity 
 “The interrelated concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, and the territorial integrity of 
states form a Gordian knot at the core of public international law” (Borgen, 2007, p. 477). 
The right to self-determination as a principle is in direct contradiction with the principle of 
territorial integrity of existing countries. If all “peoples” would use this right, that would be a 
violation of territorial integrity and borders of many countries (Degan, 2011, p. 234). 
International law unreservedly protects territorial integrity. Even in the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples is stated: 
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“Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations.” (UN Resolution 1514, 1960, art. 6) 
Many other international documents guarantee territorial integrity, among them the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970) which 
says that „no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be 
recognized as legal.“  
We already mentioned above that the UN Charter in article 2, paragraph 4, protects the 
territorial integrity of member states. It was said that this rule applies only to states - which 
that territory, at the moment of secession, is not. Our next goal is to find out what constitutes 
a country, and how it becomes a subject of international law - because, only a subject of 
international law can violate the rules of international law. 
3.3 Elements of a country 
According to Montreal Convention (1933, art. 1) , which set now the most accepted 
definition of statehood in international law, “the state as a person of international law should 
possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory1; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states” 
In the shortest, these four elements constitute a country. However, that is not enough for a 
country to be a subject of international law. It needs to be recognized by other countries. 
3.4 Recognition 
There are customary norms that new countries should be recognized. There are two theories 
of recognition – constitutive and declarative.  
The constitutive theory claims that without recognition by other states, a country cannot 
become a subject of international law. It can exist as a country, but without any international 
rights and duties. The concept of this theory is that a country which wants to become a new 
member of the international community cannot be there without the consent of old member 
countries. (Etinski, 2007, p. 88) “International law does not say that a State is not in existence 
                                                 
1 Borders do not have to be precisely determined and undisputed. Israel was accepted as a member state in the 
UN with disputed borders. (Etinski, 2007, p. 89) 
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as long as it is not recognized, but it takes no notice of it before its recognition. Through 
recognition only and exclusively a State becomes an International Person and a subject of 
International Law” (Oppenheim, 1905, p. 110, in Raič, 2002, p. 29) 
Declarative theory, on the other hand, says that a country is a subject of international law 
even if it is not recognized by other countries, having all its rights and duties in the context of 
international law. (Etinski, 2007, p. 89) When that entity fulfills all the criteria for statehood, 
that becomes a fact – whether or not is that country recognized. (Raič, 2002, p. 32) 
In the modern world, recognition is a usual act in international relations, and it is widely 
accepted to be recognized after you become a country. There is no right to recognition or 
duty to recognize. Act of recognition is in the discretion of each country. However, this 
should not be done prematurely2, otherwise it is qualified as interference in the internal 
affairs of a country.  (Etinski, 2007, pp. 88-89) 
Collective recognition or collective non-recognition can play a decisive role in giving 
secession legitimacy. A special role in this context has recognition by the parent state. 
(Kohen, 2006, p. 12) 
Recognition through international organizations is even more important than formal 
recognitions by individual states. The most important organization is The United Nations. In 
order to join the club of “all nations”, a country needs to be nominated by the UN Security 
Council and be supported by two-thirds of member states in General Assembly voting. It that 
way, countries show their readiness to establish diplomatic relations with a new country. 
3.5 Borders of a new country 
When some territory wants to secede, i.e. exercise the right to self-determination in the 
external context, it has to have a defined territory. It is accepted rule that a territory which 
wants to become a country should preserve the internal borders it had at the time before 
independence. This principle in international law is called uti possidetis juris, literally 
meaning “as you possess under law”. Originally, this principle was used for liberating 
colonies in Latin America and Africa, where internal colonial division lines are considered as 
new international borders (International Law MOOC, 2017c).  ICJ, in the decision over the 
                                                 
2 It is relative what is premature recognition. The United states (de facto) recognized Israel „two minutes“ after 
declaring independence. On the other side, Great Britain declared war on France because of the „premature 
recognition“ of the United States – two years after the USA declared independence. (Etinski, 2007, p. 90) 
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case of the Frontier Dispute – Burkina Faso and Republic of Mali, confirmed this principle 
(International Court of Justice, n.d.): 
the principles that ought to be applied were the principle of the intangibility of frontiers 
inherited from colonization and the principle of uti possidetis juris, which accords pre-
eminence to legal title over effective possession as a basis of sovereignty, and whose primary 
aim is to secure respect for the territorial boundaries which existed at the time when 
independence was achieved. The Chamber specified that, when those boundaries were no 
more than delimitations between different administrative divisions or colonies all subject to 
the same sovereign, the application of the principle of uti possidetis juris resulted in their 
being transformed into international frontiers, as in the instant case. 
Another case where this principle was reconfirmed is the case of dissolution of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter SFRY). In earlier mentioned opinion of the 
Badinter Arbitration Committee (Pellet, 1992, opinion 3), on the question put by Serbia “Can 
the internal boundaries between Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Serbia be regarded as frontiers in terms of public international law?”, Committee referred to 
the position previously given in the decolonization context: 
Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by 
international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial 
status quo and, in particular, from the principle of uti possidetis. Uti possidetis, though 
initially applied in settling decolonization issues in America and Africa, is today recognized 
as a general principle, as stated by the International Court of Justice in its Judgment of 22 
December 1986 in the case between Burkina Faso and Mali. 
Thus, uti possidetis juris is the general principle of international law, applicable to every 
situation of obtaining independence, not just in the context of decolonization – the federal 
administrative lines of Yugoslav republics have become the frontiers of newly created 
countries.  
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4 REMEDIAL RIGHT TO SECESSION 
“Outside of the process of decolonization, the exercise of the right of self-determination does 
not usually result in the creation of a new state. In non-colonial situations, secession can only 
take place with the approval of the parent state.” (Vidmar, 2010, pp. 37-38) 
However, there might be some circumstances where unilateral secession can be justified, 
even without the approval of the parent state. Those are situations where secession is a 
“remedy” for all injustice what has been done to the peoples. 
That is the case in “the situation in which, for instance, a people are persistently oppressed by 
the State, or in which its fundamental human rights are grossly and systematically violated by 
the central authorities”. (van den Driest, 2013, p. 4) “Requiring a people to remain within the 
borders of a State whatever the circumstances, would possibly ‘erect a principle of tyranny 
without measure and without end’” (Collins, 1969, p. 138 in van den Driest, 2013, p. 4) 
But how is this compatible with the principle of territorial integrity?  
Professor of international law at Maastricht University, Jure Vidmar explains that a theory of 
remedial secession limits the principle of territorial integrity, which is no more absolute and 
unlimited. A situation of “gross and systematic human rights violations can lead a state to 
lose a part of its territory if oppression is directed against a specific people” Also, a situation 
where a government does not represent the whole people belonging to the territory “is not 
entitled to invoke the principle of territorial integrity when limiting the right of self-
determination.” (Vidmar, 2010, p. 38) 
Therefore, in exceptional circumstances where the right to internal self-determination was 
flagrantly denied, those people arguably got a right to external self-determination i.e. 
secession, as a “remedy to such gross injustices”. “Until this critical point is reached, the right 
to self-determination could only be exercised within the limits set by the principle of respect 
for the territorial integrity of States, i.e. internally.” (van den Driest, 2013, p. 4) 
However, remedial secession might not have “enough support in legal doctrine and state 
practice to be considered an actual entitlement under international law”. (Vidmar, 2010, p. 
38) Looking from a moral perspective, this idea should be incorporated in contemporary 
international law as a right. (van den Driest, 2013, p. 5) 
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This is the sole, arguably legit way for unilateral secession. As possible legalization of such 
act, Vidmar reminds the Quebec case resolved by Supreme Court of Canada, saying that “the 
success of a unilateral secession depends on international recognition, and the conduct of the 
parent state toward the independence-seeking entity will be taken as a major consideration 
when states decide on granting recognition.” (Vidmar, 2010, p. 41) 
In such case, “the parent state’s right to territorial integrity becomes weaker” due to “a 
consequence of oppression”, and “the foreign states might then decide not to observe this 
right of the parent state, and to recognize the secession-seeking entity”. He emphasizes that 
“remedial secession is not an entitlement of oppressed peoples, and oppression creates no 
obligation for foreign states to grant recognition”. (ibid, p. 42) 
This concept, although widely accepted among authors, has no foundation in positive 
international law nor state practice. (ibid, p. 40) However, it will be considered in the thesis’ 
main case study – the case of Kosovo. 
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5 THE CASE STUDY OF KOSOVO 
Kosovo and Metohija (from Serbian word kos meaning blackbird and Greek word μετόχια 
meaning a monastic land) is the southern province of Serbia, with major Albanian minority 
(over 90%), which declared itself as an independent state – the Republic of Kosovo, on 17 
February 2008.  
It was strongly opposed by Serbia, which claimed that this unilateral act of secession directly 
violated its territorial integrity. 
5.1 Brief historical introduction 
Originally, Kosovo and Metohija (hereinafter Kosovo) got its status of an autonomous 
province within Serbia in 1963 Constitution of SFRY. In the next, 1974 Yugoslav 
constitution it got even broader autonomy.  Inter-ethnic tensions started to grow after Tito 
died in 1980. At that time, both sides were unsatisfied with the status of autonomy. Kosovo 
Albanians wanted a status of a federal republic, and Serbs felt discriminated by Albanians. 
With the rise of Slobodan Milošević and Serbian nationalism, in 1989, the autonomy was 
suspended (Vidmar, 2010, p. 47), and all the power over the province was in the hands of 
central organs. Albanians in 1991 declared “Republic of Kosovo” (ibid, p. 48) as an 
independent state within federal Yugoslavia. An unofficial referendum was organized, and 
Kosovo Albanians confirmed their desire for independence by an overwhelming majority. 
The only country that recognized the “new state” was Albania. Serbia further suppressed 
rights of Albanians in the province, forcing them to create parallel institutions – from 
education, healthcare, even parallel taxation system. On parallel elections in 1992, Kosovo 
Albanians voted Ibrahim Rugova for the first president of the parallel state. He advocated 
peaceful resistance to the Serbian government. Since that tactic did not bring any results, 
from 1996, peaceful resistance has been replaced with armed resistance - Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) started the violent fight for independence. Serbian police and special forces 
brutally responded, increasing violence in Kosovo. On 24 March 1999, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), contrary to the UN charter (ibid), started airstrikes against 
FRY. After 78 days of bombing, on 10 June 1999, the war came to an end. UN Security 
Council adopted resolution 1244, which will be discussed in the next subchapter. 
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5.2 Resolution 1244 
The UN Security Council, on 10 June 1999, adopted Resolution 1244 granting an 
international civil and military presence in Kosovo. Serbian police and military needed to 
withdraw from Kosovo. The provision that is the most important for our discussion – it 
confirmed sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY (now Serbia, since Serbia is the legal 
successor of FRY) over Kosovo, and calls for its “substantial autonomy” (UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244, 1999). Although originally commented as a negative resolution for 
Serbian side (which it was, Serbia lost the war), this resolution today represents the best card 
in the hands of Serbia. Since this resolution is not recalled, it means that is legally binding. 
As already mentioned, the international presence was established – civil presence was the 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (hereinafter UNMIK). “The Mission is mandated to help 
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo and advance 
regional stability in the Western Balkans” (UNMIK, n.d.). UNMIK presence is status neutral, 
even after Kosovo declaration of independence in 2008, claiming that on their official 
website: “UNMIK continues to implement its mandate in a status-neutral manner and operate 
under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).” (UNMIK, n.d.) The fact that UNMIK 
mission is still active in Kosovo is another argument that Resolution 1244 is still in effect. 
The role of UNMIK was minimized since the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo (hereinafter EULEX) took its place. However, EULEX mission also “works within 
the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244.” (EULEX, n.d.) 
Since Kosovo was demilitarised, the international military presence in the form of NATO-led 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) was established by the Resolution, to provide a secure environment in 
the province after the war. 
Twenty years after adoption, this resolution represents the key document for resolving the 
Kosovo issue - it is a framework for the UN mission in Kosovo, the EU mission in Kosovo 
(EULEX), a framework for negotiations with Serbia under the mediation of the EU, and for 
the process of joining the EU. 
5.3 Unilateral declaration of independence 
During the Vienna Negotiations on the Final Status for Kosovo in 2006 and 2007, many 
solutions were offered by Serbian side. The most prominent ones are the Hong Kong model; 
model of “dual sovereignty” or Irish model; model of South Tyrol and model of two 
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Germanies. However, Pristina rejected each of these solutions, wanting full independence. 
That, of course, was unacceptable for Serbia, which was offering the broadest possible 
autonomy (a de facto state within a state), but formally to stay as a part of Serbia. Serbian 
view of substantial autonomy was “More than autonomy, less than independence” (Radio 
Slobodna Evropa, 2005). Pristina refused all proposals, knowing that has the support of the 
Western international community and that can get the whole deal – independent Kosovo. 
And so it was, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008.  
The same day the government of Serbia annulled the act of the provisional authorities in 
Pristina as unconstitutional, confirmed by the National Assembly the next day. The president 
of Serbia, Boris Tadić stated that “Serbia will never recognize the independence of Kosovo 
and Metohija” while Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica said that unilateral declaration of 
independence of a “false state” Kosovo represents the final act of politics which started by 
1999 NATO aggression against Serbia. (B92, 2008) 
The first country that recognized Kosovo as an independent state was Costa Rica, on the 
same day of declaring independence. The next day, official recognition was made by the 
United States, France, the United Kingdom, Albania, Turkey, etc. 
Also, the EU held a meeting regarding the Kosovo issue, but since there was no consensus 
between the members, it was decided to leave each member state to decide whether or not to 
recognize Kosovo. 
Reactions of Serbia were recalling its ambassadors from the countries who recognized 
Kosovo as an independent country; raising criminal charges against the Kosovar leaders. 
Also, the UN Security Council emergency session was convoked because of Kosovo. 
Four days after the declaration, on 21 February, big protest under the name “Kosovo is 
Serbia” was organized by the Serbian government and National Assembly. That was one of 
the largest protests in the history of Serbia.  
Belgrade continued the legal struggle to challenge Kosovo’s secession. With the aim of 
slowing the recognition pace, Serbia proposed a resolution to the UN General Assembly 
asking the ICJ for an advisory opinion over the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence from Serbia. The very next day after the resolution was adopted, Montenegro 
and Macedonia (today North Macedonia) recognized Kosovo as a state. After that decision, 
Serbia expelled ambassadors of Montenegro and Macedonia, pronouncing them “personas 
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non grata”. "‘The reason why we opted for this sharp measure ... is because the decision in 
Podgorica [and Skopje] came a day after the vote in the UN,’ Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk 
Jeremić told radio B92, referring to a decision Wednesday by the UN General Assembly to 
give the green light to a Serbian resolution calling on the International Court of Justice to rule 
if Kosovo's independence was in accordance with the international law.“ (Deutsche Welle, 
2008) 
5.4 ICJ advisory opinion 
The question for ICJ advisory opinion requested by Serbia was: “Is the unilateral declaration 
of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance 
with international law?” (Kosovo advisory opinion, 2010)  
On 22 July 2010, ICJ ruled that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate 
international law, because “general international law contains no applicable prohibition of 
declarations of independence” (ibid). As we can see, the Court did not go into the essence of 
the Serbian question, but rather answered formally. Although it concluded that “declaration 
of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law” it also stated 
in paragraph 56 of the Advisory opinion that “it is entirely possible for a particular act — 
such as a unilateral declaration of independence — not to be in violation of international law 
without necessarily constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it.” 
The Court was not deciding whether or not Kosovo had a right to secede from Serbia, saying 
that “issues relating to the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence of any 
right of ‘remedial secession’ are beyond the scope of the question posed by the General 
Assembly”. (ibid) 
From this point, we can say that the question was not precise enough. For example, the 
question for the Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of Quebec, was looking for the answer 
“whether there was a right to ‘effect secession’, and whether there was a rule of international 
law which conferred a positive entitlement” for the secession. (ibid) In the case of Kosovo, it 
was asked was the declaration “in accordance with” international law. The Court (ibid) said: 
The answer to that question turns on whether or not the applicable international law 
prohibited the declaration of independence … The Court is not required by the question it has 
been asked to take a position on whether international law conferred a positive entitlement on 
Kosovo unilaterally to declare its independence or, a fortiori, on whether international law 
generally confers an entitlement on entities situated within a State unilaterally to break away 
from it.  
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Each side interpreted the decision in its favour. Serbia stated that the Court was not deciding 
on merits of the secession, but rather decided formally, while Kosovar leadership celebrated 
the verdict saying that this is a confirmation of the legitimacy of Kosovo independence. 
Kosovo’s president Fatmir Sejdiu stated: "Today's opinion of the court ultimately removes all 
the dilemmas that the countries that have not yet recognized the Republic of Kosovo might 
have had until now" (BBC, 2010) 
By that moment, sixty-nine countries have recognized Kosovo as a state (ibid) At the moment 
of writing this thesis, around a hundred countries (the exact number is unknown) recognizes 
Kosovo as an independent country.  
5.5 Kosovo’s independence beyond advisory opinion 
Relying on the reviewed literature, we will now briefly take a peek at the essence of 
Kosovo’s independence, in order to find out whether or not there was a right to “effect 
secession”. 
What is indisputable is that in this very case, the national law of parent state is violated. 
Unlike its predecessor countries, Serbia is a unitary state whose Constitution states: “The 
territory of the Republic of Serbia is inseparable and indivisible. The border of the Republic 
of Serbia is inviolable and may be altered in a procedure applied to amend the Constitution.” 
(Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 2006, art. 8) The preamble of the Serbian constitution 
is even more straightforward stating that “the Province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral 
part of the territory of Serbia, that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the 
sovereign state of Serbia and that from such status of the Province of Kosovo and Metohija 
follow constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of 
Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign political relations” (ibid, pmbl.) 
However, Kosovo its right derives from the dissolution of Yugoslavia.  
In Kosovo declaration of Independence (2008) it is stated that the Kosovo case is “arising 
from Yugoslavia's non-consensual breakup”. However, that is not possible, since Kosovo did 
not have a status of a federal republic within Yugoslavia, but it was, together with Vojvodina, 
a province of Socialist Republic of Serbia, one of the six constituent republics of the SFRY. 
Also, we should recall that Kosovo unilaterally declared independence back in 1991, 
proclaiming itself as an independent republic within SFRY. Although that was done after 
Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, reaction to Kosovo’s declaration was 
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different. While many countries recognized Slovenia and Croatia, Kosovo was recognized 
only by Albania. Its declaration was ignored both by Serbia and the international community. 
Also, the Badinter commission ignored the fact that Kosovo had a referendum and declared 
independence. It was discussing only about „six republics“ which can arise from SFRY. 
In the theoretical part of the thesis, we concluded that minorities do not have a right to 
secede, but have a right to internal self-determination. Just like Serbs in Krajina or Republic 
of Srpska did not have a right to secede from the existing borders of federal republics of 
Yugoslavia, the same analogy applies to Kosovo Albanians within Serbia. 
However, they have “the right to recognition of their identity under international law” and 
“must therefore be afforded every right accorded to minorities under international convention 
as well as national and international guarantees consistent with the principles of international 
law” (Pellet, 1992, p. 184) 
5.6 Remedial secession of Kosovo? 
This thesis backs the position of authors who support the remedial right to secession for those 
peoples who are victims of injustices and massive violations of human rights. 
Although Kosovo does not explicitly claim that its case is the case of remedial secession, it 
makes sense to analyze whether the remedial secession is possible in this situation. Kosovo 
Albanians no doubt suffered serious injustices and violations of human rights during the war, 
but another aspect of the remedial right is debatable in this case.  
“If remedial secession is understood as the last resort for ending oppression, this argument 
could only have been accepted if Kosovo had declared independence in 1999. It is difficult to 
see how secession in 2008 ended any oppression. At the time of the Declaration, Kosovo had 
been governed independently of Serbia for almost nine years” (Vidmar, 2010, p. 49) 
Therefore, this argument of remedial secession would be acceptable if Kosovo declared 
independence in 1999. In 2008, there was no oppression, and as Vidmar reminded, Serbia did 
not exercise sovereignty in the province since the end of the war. 
So, there was no reason for remedial secession and escaping from oppression, because there 
was no oppression in 2008 - in fact, there was a new, democratic government in power, 
which was very flexible and offered the broadest possible autonomy that exists. If there was 
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political will on the Albanian side, they could fully exercise their right to “internal self-
determination”.  
We must conclude that the argument of remedial secession in the case of Kosovo 
independence in 2008, is inapplicable. “Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 was 
not the last resort for ending oppression” (ibid, p. 50) 
5.7 Loophole of the Resolution 1244 
Albanian side missed one great chance for legitimizing Kosovo independence toward the 
international community - they did not have a referendum. Although we know that vast 
majority of Kosovo population is for independence, this way it is more legitimate to justify 
such a declaration. Besides formal, there is a substantial reason for this. Namely, Resolution 
1244 (1999), in the article 11 says that future status of Kosovo will be determined “taking 
into account the Rambouillet accords” which left the possibility for Kosovo to decide its 
future status on a referendum after three years. However, there was no referendum organized 
three years later, and not even nine years later - before the declaration, but the declaration 
was proclaimed. A chance to finalize the Resolution 1244 into their favour was missed by 
Kosovo leadership. 
5.8 Recognition of Kosovo 
After Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, the international community was split over 
the issue. Many Western countries earlier announced that they will recognize Kosovo if 
declare its independence. On the other hand, countries such as Russia, China, India and Spain 
supported the Serbian position. EU could not agree on a common position on Kosovo issue, 
so left every member country to individually decide whether or not to recognize Kosovo as 
an independent country. It was recognized by the majority of EU countries. The ones who did 
not recognize Kosovo were, and still are, Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, and Cyprus. 
In 2019, at the moment of writing this thesis, approximately a hundred UN member countries 
have recognized Kosovo as a country. The exact number is unknown because many countries 
Pristina claimed they recognized Kosovo, stated that they did not, or they revoked their 
recognition. Officially, countries that withdrawn their recognition of Kosovo are Suriname, 
Madagascar, Burundi, Comoros, Dominica, Grenada, Solomon Islands, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Lesotho, Papua New Guinea, and Palau. Reasons some of 
these thirteen UN member countries stated in their letters to the Ministry of foreign affairs of 
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Serbia (personal communication, May 21, 2019)3 are that they encourage the dialog, and they 
do not want to prejudice the final status of Kosovo before negotiations are over.  
Although we said that in contemporary international law declarative theory of recognition is 
widely accepted, we must see that in circumstances like these, Kosovo can become neither 
UN member state nor a part of the EU in the future. Even if they provide a two-thirds 
majority of countries to vote for their membership in the UN, that decision cannot pass the 
UN Security Council, where the veto of Russia and China will block every attempt of Kosovo 
to join the UN.  
In the EU, that veto will be from Spain, which in many situations has a firmer position that 
Serbia itself. For example, Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy did not want to attend a 
summit of the EU and the Western Balkans because of the participation of Kosovo (European 
Data News Hub, 2018), or Spanish ignoring of Kosovo in sports tournaments, where Spain 
refused to fly Kosovar flag or play the Kosovo anthem. (N1, 2019) 
5.9 Kosovo* and the EU 
Kosovo has the status of a potential candidate for accession to the EU. On its path to Europe, 
Kosovo got an asterisk beside its name. Kosovo*, with an asterisk and footnote stating “This 
designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 
and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.” (European Comission, 
2019), is a result of the agreement of Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in Brussels, mediated by the 
EU. 
It that way, Kosovo was allowed to participate in all regional meetings and be represented 
toward third parties. Although the EU is formally status-neutral, twenty-three out of twenty-
eight member states of the EU recognized Kosovo. With or without an asterisk, Kosovo is in 
the “Stabilisation and Association process”, in order to one day join the EU. But as we know, 
no regions and provinces can join the EU, only “countries” (European Commision, 2016). 
Therefore, the legit question is – How will Kosovo, in current position, join the EU? 
It is expected that Serbia will meet the criteria to join the EU before Kosovo*. However, 
Serbia with current constitution cannot join the EU without Kosovo, which is an “integral 
part of the territory of Serbia” (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 2006, pmbl.).  
                                                 
3 Email is available from the author. 
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Possible solution for this stalemate can be that Serbia “waits” for Kosovo* to be ready, and 
together join the EU. 
On the other hand, the EU probably will not allow “new Cyprus” as its new member, and 
importing unresolved issues. Therefore, it will insist that all unresolved issues must be 
resolved before joining the EU. 
Kosovo with its current political status cannot join the EU. Serbia (and Kosovo) obliged “that 
neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side’s progress in their 
respective EU paths” (Brussels Agreement, 2013). Serbia does not need to encourage Spain, 
which already has a firmer position than Serbia, to block Kosovo – Spain is going to do it 
because of its own problems with separatism in, before others, Basque Country and 
Catalonia. And without the consensus of all member states, the new state can not join the EU.  
5.10 North Kosovo 
North Kosovo is an unofficial name for a region with a predominantly Serbian population on 
Kosovo. It consists of four municipalities: North Kosovska Mitrovica, Zvečan, Leposavić, 
and Zubin Potok, and it represents around 10 percent of Kosovo’s territory. North Kosovo is 
territorially linked with Central Serbia, while the rest of Serbs live in enclaves under the Ibar 
river. 
North Kosovo is still under control of Serbia, although after the Brussels Agreement between 
Belgrade and Pristina was achieved (2013), North Kosovo was formally integrated into the 
Kosovo legal system. By that agreement, parallel structures of Serbs in the North were shut, 
and Kosovo Serbs were integrated within Kosovo’s framework, including police and security 
structures, judiciary etc. In return, Pristina agreed to create the Association of Serb 
Municipalities (Serbian: Zajednica srpskih opština), which was planned to be a self-
governing organ of municipalities with Serb majority on Kosovo. This organ would not have 
executive or legislative authorities, but it would have jurisdiction in the area of education, 
health, economic development etc. However, more than six years after the Brussels 
Agreement was signed by both parties, Pristina did not fulfill its only obligation.  
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5.11 Kosovo in 2019 
Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina are on hold at the moment. Pristina imposed 100% 
import tariff against products from Serbia (and Bosnia and Herzegovina), violating CEFTA 
free-trade agreement. Serbia said that there will be no dialogue until tariff decision is 
revoked. On the other side, Kosovo’s prime minister Ramush Haradinaj said that Kosovo will 
revoke its decision only after Serbia recognizes Kosovo (Al Jazeera Balkans, 2019a) 
This year did not start promising for two sides. As already mentioned, the Association of 
Serb Municipalities has not yet been established, although more than six years passed after 
the Brussels Agreement. The president of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi stated on 30 May 2019 that 
he will not permit establishing the Association of Serb Municipalities because that would 
mean “creating the Republic of Srpska on Kosovo” (Radio television Serbia [hereinafter 
RTS], 2019a). The firm reaction of the EU, as a guarantor of the Agreement, was missing. A 
day later, he stated that if the EU keeps isolating Kosovo, Kosovo will consider unification 
with Albania. “If the EU does not want to accept two Albanian countries with two flags, then 
they should accept only one flag” (Al Jazeera Balkans, 2019b). In the same statement, he said 
that unification shall also include Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac, three municipalities in 
south Serbia with Albanian population.  
Pristina dramatically sharpened its rhetoric in 2019. The dialogue between two sides has been 
stalled, and no progress has been made in 2019. “Frozen conflict” does not suit any side. 
Kosovo will be blocked for every attempt to join international organizations, while Serbia 
will be blocked on its integration into the EU. However, Kosovo is still in a better position 
because it has the political support of the West. Since the leading countries of the West 
support Pristina in exercising its power over the whole territory of Kosovo, it is a matter of 
time when Pristina will try to take over the control of the North Kosovo. Serbia cannot 
intervene militarily, which represents another trump in the hands of Pristina.  
In the scenario where Kosovo would unify with Albania – which is not a probable scenario 
because the international community would not allow it, Kosovo would get it all.  
It would finally become a part of the UN because Albania is already a member. It would 
automatically become a member of the NATO, and many other international organizations 
through Albanian membership. 
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5.12 Partition of Kosovo? 
In order to finally solve the status of Kosovo, many ideas have been proposed in the last few 
years - the most prominent one being a partition of Kosovo. The separation line for the 
division would be an ethnic line separating “Serbian” part of Kosovo – North Kosovo and 
probably enclaves in the south, and “Albanian” part. That idea is not new - originally was 
proposed by Serbian politician Dobrica Ćosić in 1990. The idea was reproposed by the 
president of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić (B92, 2018). It is the last attempt of Serbia to get 
anything, since Kosovo slowly slips toward full independence, and soon could get control 
over the North. However, both sides know that Kosovo will never become a member of the 
UN, the most important international organization, without Serbian consent. Russia and 
China will block any attempt in the UN Security Council. And because of that fact, Serbia is 
playing on that card in order to get whatever is possible at this moment. President Vučić, in 
the interview given on 4 March 2019 to Italian news agency ANSA, announced the 
possibility that Serbia recognizes Kosovo if Belgrade gets something in return, stating: “We 
must first find the compromise - we cannot recognize Kosovo, without getting anything from 
the other side” (Radio Free Europe, 2019).  Even if there is a will to do so, the Serbian 
constitution is prohibiting such action. In order to amend the Constitution regarding Kosovo, 
a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly is needed (it is quite possible with the current 
structure of parliament), but also the majority on a referendum which must be organized in 
such case. If all sides, including the international community, want to achieve this solution, 
now is perfect timing for that, since the current government in Serbia has broad support in 
parliament and can make this happen. Due to political turmoil in Serbia at the moment, this 
situation can easily change next year after elections, so the window for reaching an 
agreement that can be easily accepted by Serbian side is less than one year. 
However, dialogue requires (at least) two sides. Although Pristina initially accepted to talk 
about such idea, extending it to “land swap”4 (RTS, 2019b), later this year that idea was 
rejected (Associated Press, 2019).  
The partition idea has its pros and cons. This way would be legalized the actual situation 
existing in reality, where Serbs in the North living in a parallel system, considering 
themselves as citizens of Serbia, and Albanians under the Ibar river - live separately, without 
                                                 
4 In that scenario Preševo Valley in southern Serbia, with major Albanian population, would join Kosovo, while 
in return, Serbia would get North Kosovo, with Serb majority. 
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coexistence or any contact with each other. The problem is that this solution is anti-European 
- in the time where Europe is integrating and uniting, the Balkan region would be redrawing 
borders on ethnical principle. However, this solution (along with rights for Serbs in enclaves, 
exterritorial status for Serbian medieval monasteries and other Serbian cultural heritage on 
Kosovo) would probably end a decades-long problem between two nations and provide a 
long-term solution for Kosovo issue, giving an opportunity for both sides to focus on their 
European future (and ironically be reunited). The biggest problem with this solution is that it 
will open Pandora’s box and it would become a precedent for the border redrawing, 
especially in the region. But in fact, the first precedent in this context was made in the case of 
Kosovo. 
5.13 Conclusion 
Eleven years after declaring independence, Kosovo is still struggling. Its statehood is 
contested by many. Half of the world recognizes Kosovo as an independent country, and half 
of it recognizes Kosovo as a southern province of Serbia.  
This fact serves as proof that problems cannot be resolved by unilateral acts, but as a result of 
dialogue and compromise. In many aspects, Kosovo still depends on Serbia. The North of 
Kosovo is de facto controlled by Serbia; Serbia is blocking Kosovo joining international 
organizations such as Interpol, UNESCO…and most important organization for every 
country - the United Nations. 
On the other side, Serbia cannot join the EU without resolving the Kosovo issue. 
For Serbia, Kosovo is not just 15% of the territory. It has deep historical and spiritual 
meaning for Serbian people. More than thousand Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries 
are on Kosovo today, including four medieval monasteries under UNESCO protection. Also, 
there are economic reasons – Serbian property in Kosovo by some estimates worths 200 
billion euros (Politika, 2018). Serbia, considering it as a part of its territory, plays the debt of 
Kosovo (Politika, 2017), 
Kosovo in reality exercises sovereignty everywhere except the North, which is indirectly 
controlled by the Serbian government.  As a result of that reality, dual sovereignty model is 
again mentioned as a potential solution for resolving the Kosovo issue. In that scenario, 
Serbia would enjoy sovereignty over North Kosovo and Serbian cultural heritage in the 
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province, while Pristina will control the rest of Kosovo. In return, Serbia would recognize 
Kosovo, and provide its membership in the UN.  
The second option is the partition of Kosovo, with all its consequences mention in the 
previous subchapter. 
The third option would be that Serbia recognizes Kosovo with its current borders, which is 
not probable. 
And the fourth one is status quo - Serbia will say that Kosovo is its southern province, 
Kosovo will state that it is an independent country, and it will remain a hotspot of conflicts 
even twenty years after the war ended. Therefore, both sides with open-ended support of the 
international community must sit at the negotiation table and make a historical agreement, 
with the primary goal of reconciliation of two nations and building future together. Finding a 
solution for the final status of Kosovo is crucial for the peace and stability of the region. The 
final settlement for Kosovo needs to be a result of compromise.   
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6 THE CASE STUDY OF CATALONIA 
Catalonia is an autonomous community and historic region, positioned on north-eastern 
Spain. It counts seven million people, which represent 17 percent of the total population of 
Spain. It is one of the most developed and wealthiest regions of Spain.  
Catalan language, a Latin language closely related to Spanish, is spoken by half of the 
inhabitants of Catalonia. It is an official language in the public administration, judiciary, and 
schools in Catalonia. (Beary, 2011, p. 309)  
Catalonia has its own parliament, flag, anthem, and special status within the Kingdom of 
Spain. That distinction can be seen through the whole of its history. 
6.1 History 
The tradition of Catalan independence dates back to the 9th century (ibid, p. 310) In the 15th 
century, Catalonia was part of the Crown of Aragon and was a powerful trading empire and 
included eastern Spain, Mediterranean, and southern Italy. This Union with Aragon enabled 
to Catalonia, even at this early stage, some characteristics of the modern states, such as a 
common language and well-developed political, legal, and economic structures. (Connolly, 
2013, pp. 55-56). 
That independent kingdom lasted until the 15th century, when Ferdinand, King of the Aragon 
married Isabel, Queen of Castile, and two crowns were united for the first time. (Guibernau, 
2013, p. 10) However, Catalonia still maintained its own culture and the Catalan language. 
The Catalan self-government existed until the early 18th century and the Spanish War of 
Succession. (Connolly, 2013, p. 56). 
In the Spanish War of Succession (1701-1714), Catalonia supported the Austrians and 
Charles VI before the Bourbon claimant Philip V in pretensions for the Spanish throne. 
Catalonia found itself on the defeated side when the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) confirmed 
Philip V as king of Spain. He set up a regime of occupation, ordered the dissolution of 
Catalan political institutions and terminated their separate institutions, laws, and rights. The 
Catalan language was banned and Castilian (Spanish) imposed as official, although the 
majority of Catalan people could not understand it. (Guibernau, 2013, p. 10) 
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During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), General Francisco Franco abolished the 
autonomy of Catalonia in 1938, and continued suppressing Catalan political institutions and 
Catalan identity, by banning the Catalan language and all Catalan symbols, such as flag and 
anthem. (ibid, pp. 10, 13). 
After dictatorship has ended, Catalonia voted for the adoption of a democratic Spanish 
Constitution in 1978, in which Catalonia recovered its political and cultural autonomy, 
restored the Generalitat (the government of Catalonia) and got a new Statute of Autonomy in 
1979. (Conolly, 2013, pp. 56-57) 
6.2 1978 Spanish Constitution 
The new 1978 constitution, which is the current constitution of Spain, aspires to transform 
Spain into a democratic state, but article two of the Constitution “reveals the tension between 
defending the unity of Spain and the pressure for the historical nationalities of Catalonia, 
Galicia and the Basque Country to be recognized” (Guibernau, 2013, p. 12). It states that “the 
Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and 
indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognises and guarantees the right to self-
government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among 
them all.” (Spanish constitution, 1978, art. 2)  
The Constitution (ibid, art. 143, par. 1) defines the distribution of the competences between 
self-governing communities and the central government in Madrid:  
In the exercise of the right to self-government recognised in section 2 of the Constitution, 
bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, insular 
territories and provinces with a historic regional status may accede to self-government and 
form Self-governing Communities (Comunidades Autónomas) in conformity with the 
provisions contained in this Part and in the respective Statutes.  
 The actual power of a community emanates from a statute of autonomy of a region. 
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6.3 1979 Statute of Autonomy 
The Statute of Autonomy is the equivalent to a Catalan regional Constitution. After Franco’s 
dictatorship, Catalonia sanctioned a new Statute of the Autonomy in 1979. (Guibernau, 2013, 
p. 13) Professor Guibernau explains the position of Catalonia and Catalans within Spain: 
The Preliminary Section of the Statute defines Catalonia as a nationality which “in order to 
accede to self-government, constitutes itself as a Self-Governing Community in accordance 
with the Constitution and with this Statute” (Article 1.1) and the Generalitat as “the institution 
around which the self-government of Catalonia is politically organized” (Article 1.2). The 
powers of the Generalitat “emanate from the Constitution, this Statute and the people” 
(Article 1.3). “The people (the Catalans) stand in third place. This point stresses the existence 
of a single sovereign demos in Spanish democracy, constituted by all Spaniards, including the 
Catalans, which on ratifying the Constitution made the autonomy of Catalonia possible. This 
interpretation considers the Catalan people to be a ‘sub-group’ of the demos formed by all the 
citizens of Spain. 
The first Catalan election under the provisions of the 1979 Statute held on 20 March 1980 
and brought victory to the Jordi Pujol who was the leader of the party “Convergència 
Democràtica de Catalunya”. His predecessor, Tarradellas, had been loyal to the Spanish 
government and avoided confrontation with it. Pujol, whose party soon made a coalition with 
Unió, the old Christian Democratic group, announced in his inauguration that his policies 
would be nationalistic. He was re-elected several times and governed Catalonia until 2003. 
He played a key role in building Catalan institutions, language, and culture after 40 years of 
repression. (Tortella, 2017, p. 211).  
About the following period, Guibernau (2013, p.14) notices:  
At the time Catalonia played a key role in the democratization of Spain by strongly 
supporting EU membership, providing economic and industrial leadership and being 
committed to solidarity towards Spain. Vitally, Catalan nationalism was instrumental in 
overcoming the 1993 crisis and strongly supported Spain to fulfil the conditions to join the 
Euro. However, it was felt by many that Catalan loyalty and support did not pay off as Spain 
reinforced centralism. By and large, the Catalan nationalist movement had never been 
overwhelmingly secessionist. Since its inception in the late nineteenth century, secession from 
Spain had not been the objective of its leaders, instead, different alternative options—ranging 
from federation to political autonomy—have embodied the main Catalan nationalist projects. 
 
6.4 2006 Statute of Autonomy  
After the November 2003 elections, Catalonia got new leadership - Catalan Socialist Party 
and its leader - Pasqual Maragall who became President. After coming to power, Maragall 
proposed the drafting of a new Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia. (ibid) Reformed version 
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of Catalonia's Autonomy Statute was agreed by the Spanish and Catalan Parliaments and 
ratified by the Catalan people via referendum. (Guibernau, 2013, p. 16) Its preamble used the 
word "nation" to describe Catalonia: “In reflection of the feelings and the wishes of the 
citizens of Catalonia, the Parliament of Catalonia has defined Catalonia as a nation by an 
ample majority. The Spanish Constitution, in its second Article, recognizes the national 
reality of Catalonia as a nationality” (Organic Act 6/2006 of the 19th July, on the Reform of 
the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia [hereinafter The Statute of Catalonia], 2006, pmbl.) 
Right after ratification, the Statute has been challenged in the Spanish High Court of Justice, 
with the claims that some of its provisions are unconstitutional. (Guibernau, 2013, p. 16) 
6.4.1 The Spanish Constitutional Court against the 2006 Statute 
The Constitutional Court reached the sentence four years after, on June 28, 2010 (ibid) The 
court upheld the constitutionality of the Statute, declaring 14 articles as unconstitutional. 
Articles that have been declared as unconstitutional refer to the use of the term “Catalonia as 
a nation”. Such formulation is considered as contrary to Article 1 of the 1978 Spanish 
Constitution which recognizes the existence of only one Spanish nation within Spain. 
Likewise, the preferential status assigned to the Catalan language within Statute has also been 
declared unconstitutional, opposing Article 3.1 of the Constitution, which recognizes 
Castilian as the official language. “The Constitutional Tribunal did not oppose Catalan being 
the language of normal usage in Catalonia but did oppose the ‘preferential’ qualifier which 
would jeopardize the co-official nature to give legal primacy to Catalan” (Petithomme, 
Garcia, 12). Articles referred to setting up “The Council of Justice of Catalonia” and “The 
president of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia” who was supposed to be “nominated by 
the King, on the proposal of the General Council of Judicial Power”, were all deemed 
unconstitutional. (Petithomme & Garcia, 2013, pp. 11-12) 
The nationalists understood this decision “as an act of contempt against the will of the 
Catalan people expressed by its Parliament and a referendum”, as stated by Argelia Queralt 
Jimenez, Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Barcelona, and it led to massive 
demonstrations in Barcelona, the day after the decision was published. (Center for Global 
Constitutionalism, 2014) 
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6.5 Catalan elections 2012 
Further political opportunities in Catalonia are being developed in the light of increasing 
demands for Catalan independence. It is important to remind that Catalonia is one of the 
wealthiest regions in Spain, that most of their finances were reallocated to the poorer parts of 
the country, which, ultimately, with historical reasons and political events, led to a great 
aspiration for independence. 
Catalonian elections were held on 25 November 2012, where Artur Mas was elected as 
President of the Government of Catalonia. Results of the election brought more power to the 
nationalist parties, which propagated independence. Such election results led to the request 
for organizing the first independence referendum. However, Artur Mas was aware that 
referendum would not be in accordance with the Spanish constitution, and explained that this 
would be "consultation", without legal effects. (Petithomme, Garcia, 2013, pp. 14-15) 
6.6 Non-binding referendum 2014 
The next steps towards Catalan independence included “Declaration of sovereignty and the 
right to self-determination by the people of Catalonia” approved by The Catalan Parliament. 
However, this declaration did not have legal consequences and it was “purely rhetorical” as 
stated by Catalan News report on the day of the approval (Catalan News, 2013). The 
declaration stated that the Catalan people have, because of democratic legitimacy, the status 
of a politically and legally sovereign subject (ibid). In 2014 the Spanish Constitutional Court 
declared this Declaration as “null and void” (Alcade & Aguiar, 2017, p. 19), stating that term 
“sovereignty” can be related only to Spanish people as a whole. According to this decision, 
holding a self-determination referendum in Catalonia would not be legal.  
To circumvent this decision, Artur Mas announces that instead of a self-determination 
referendum, Catalonia will hold consultation - a non-binding referendum, on 9 November 
2014, proclaiming it as a “process of citizen’s participation”. (ibid) Despite the Spanish 
Government led by Mariano Rajoy trying to block this process by challenging it in front of 
Spanish Constitutional Court, and Court suspending the vote, consultation on independence 
was held. Citizens had the opportunity to answer two questions: “Do you want Catalonia to 
become a State?” and “Do you want this State to be independent?” More than 2,300,000 
votes were cast, with 80.8% of the votes for “yes-yes” option. (ibid, pp. 20-21) 
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Following the consultation results, a new phase in Catalan sovereignty pretensions has begun. 
On the Catalan political scene, polarization continues among parties “for independence” and 
“against independence”. In September 2015 regional elections, pro-independence parties 
Junts pel Si (Together for Yes) coalition and Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) won an 
absolute majority and announced the creation of an independent Catalan state. (BBC, 2015) 
In November 2015 Catalonia’s parliament issued “the Declaration of the Initiation of the 
Process of Independence of Catalonia”, declaring the beginning of the process of forming an 
independent state. They faced with the strong confrontation of Spain’s central government 
and its leader, Mariano Rajoy, who announced the appeal to the Constitutional Court. (The 
Telegraph, 2015) 
On the January 9th, 2016, Artur Mas disclosed that he will not stand as a candidate for re-
election to the presidency of the Catalan Government, as a result of the agreement between 
Junts pel Si and CUP party, who formed the Catalan government. (Catalan News, 2016a) 
6.7 Referendum 2017 
For the next president of the Government, Catalan Parliament declared Carles Puigdemont, 
ex-mayor of Girona and President of the Association of Municipalities for Independence, 
who continued Catalan pro-independence politics. In September 2016 he announced that a 
binding referendum on Catalonia’s independence will take place. He indicated the will of 
Catalan government for negotiating with Madrid regarding a legally binding referendum - but 
emphasized readiness to hold the referendum in either case. (Catalan News, 2016b) 
On 7 October 2016, Catalan Parliament passed the bill to hold a referendum in Catalonia by 
September 2017. According to this bill, the referendum is to be binding, and in the case of 
“yes” for independence answer, constitutive elections are to be called within six months. 
Members of the Parliament from the “Junts pel Si” and far-left CUP party voted in favor of 
this proposal, while alternative left alliance “Catalunya Si Que es Pot” abstained. (Catalan 
News, 2016c) 
On the press conference, organized on 24 January 2017 in the European Parliament, 
Puigdemont has called European institutions to “be part of the solution” for Catalan situation, 
and explained that at that point: “The issue at stake is not independence but democracy” 
(Catalan News, 2017a). In the meantime, the Spanish Government has initiated judicial 
processes against pro-independence politicians. Puigdemont emphasized that referendum is a 
44 
matter of the right of the Catalan people to give their vote, regardless of what their vote 
would be. (ibid) 
On the 4 June, the Catalan government presented the draft of the so-called “Self-
Determination Referendum Act” and on the 9 June 2017, the Catalan president, Carles 
Puigdemont, announced that the Catalan independence referendum will be held on 1 October 
2017, emphasizing once again, that they have been seeking agreement with the Spanish 
Government, but the government refused to negotiate. “Fulfilling our democratic 
commitment, today we have collectively ratified, with the Vice President and all our 
ministers, our willingness to call the citizens of our country, in the exercise of their legitimate 
right to self-determination, to a referendum that will be held on Sunday, October 1," 
Puigdemont announced (Catalan News, 2017b). The reaction of the Spanish government 
came immediately – claiming that the referendum will not take a place because it is illegal 
and unconstitutional. They stated that the government will file charges if any actions are 
undertaken to organize it. (Catalan News, 2017c)  
Although the Referendum Act calling for independence was announced to be approved in 
August, the Catalan Parliament passed the Self-Determination Referendum Bill, on 6 
September 2017. (BBC, 2017a)  
The first part of this Bill (Law 19/2017 on the Referendum on Self-determination [hereinafter 
Catalonia referendum act], 2017) is “Explanatory memorandum” which explains the legal 
framework for making a decision to call a referendum: 
The International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, approved by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 December 1966, 
ratified and in force in the Kingdom of Spain since 1977—published in Spain’s Official 
Gazette, the BOE, on 30 April 1977—recognise the right of all peoples to self-determination 
as the first human right. Likewise, article 1.2 of the Charter of the United Nations and Statute 
of the International Court of Justice establishes amongst its purposes to develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 establishes, in Article 96, that 
international treaties ratified by Spain form part of its domestic legislation and, in Article 
10.2, establishes that the rules on fundamental rights and public freedoms shall be interpreted 
in accordance with applicable international treaties on the matter. 
Therefore, they are referring to international conventions granting the right to self-
determination, and the fact that ratified international treaties are part of the internal legal 
system. However, they ignored the fact that these provisions cannot be contrary to the 
Constitution (Spanish constitution, art. 95, par. 1) and that right to self-determination can 
45 
manifest in various forms, including internal self-determination which Catalonia already 
exercised. 
The question for the referendum is stated in article 4: “Do you want Catalonia to be an 
independent state in the form of a republic?”. Bill explained the nature of this referendum and 
logistic aspects of voting. The right to vote is granted to “all those persons with the right to 
vote in the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia”. It also guaranteed fair conditions for 
political campaigns, and establishes The Electoral Commission of Catalonia. (Catalonia 
referendum act, 2017)  
The signing of the Bill caused an immediate reaction of the Spanish government, which 
appealed the Referendum bill before the constitutional court. The constitutional court 
suspended the Catalan independence referendum and its legal framework within a few hours - 
as a temporary measure, and started deliberations to reach a final measure. The Spanish 
government also warned Carles Puigdemont and all his ministers could face criminal charges. 
These acts signified the beginning of the Spanish constitutional crisis. (Catalan News, 2017d) 
6.7.1 September events 
During September, the Spanish government continued with repression measures. Spanish 
vice president, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria, warned that every activity related to the 
referendum will deal with “proper legal response”. Catalan official referendum website was 
closed down, 712 mayors who gave support to the referendum were summoned to court and 
the Spanish Post Office was asked to refrain from the activities connected with the 
referendum. Spanish state executives even announced the possibility of cutting power to 
polling stations. (Catalan News, 2017e) 
On 20 September 2017 Spanish political crisis reached its peak. By the order of the trial court 
number 13 of Barcelona, the Spanish Civil Guard started police operation in the offices of the 
Catalan government in order to stop the referendum from taking a place. Fourteen Catalan 
officials involved in the preparation of the referendum was arrested and police searched for 
materials related to the referendum, such as ballot papers and ballot boxes. As a reaction to 
this police operation, people began to gather protesting. (BBC, 2017b) 
Carles Puigdemont described this intervention as “a co-ordinated police assault” that showed 
that Madrid “has de facto suspended self-government and applied a de facto state of 
emergency” in Catalonia. Spanish Prime Minister kept arguing that referendum is illegal 
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because the Spanish Constitution does not allow a vote on self-determination. “There is no 
democratic state in the world that would accept what these people are trying to do. They have 
been warned and they know the referendum cannot take place.”, Rajoy stated. (The Guardian, 
2017a) 
Puigdemont announced that referendum will take place because it still has the support “of the 
immense majority of citizens, who are fed up with the arrogance and the abuses” of the 
government in Madrid. He stated that the Catalan government has a contingency plan and 
that it is ready to face with upcoming events, pointing out that referendum is no longer a 
matter of political relationship with Spain, but respecting freedom. (Catalan News, 2017f) 
The Catalan government and its people were without international support for their struggle 
for independence. The reaction of the United States’ officials on the referendum mainly 
characterized it as an internal question of Spain, expressing hope for a peaceful solution to 
the political crisis. President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, while 
responding to the question if he would recognize a “yes” in the referendum, answered: “We 
have always said on the subject that we would follow and respect the rulings of the Spanish 
constitutional court and parliament but it is obvious that if a “yes” for Catalan independence 
comes to pass – which we’ll have to wait and see – we would respect that choice. But 
Catalonia could not become an EU member the day after the vote.” He also said that 
Catalonia, in such case, probably would not be able to join the EU because the process of 
joining would give Spain a veto. (Euro News, 2017)  
6.7.2 The day of the referendum 
As announced in the Referendum Bill draft, and later confirmed, the question asked on the 
Referendum was: “Do you want Catalonia to become an independent state in the form of a 
republic?” (Catalonia referendum act, 2017). At the referendum day, Spanish riot police 
confronted citizens in several polling stations in Catalonia, including Girona where 
Puigdemont was supposed to vote. Although referendum supporters tried to prevent police 
from getting in the polling stations, the police crackdown started as soon as polling stations 
opened.  
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As the Catalan News (2017g) reported that day:  
At the polling station where president Carles Puigdemont was expected to vote, riot police 
have used shields and hammers to smash their way through the glass doors and gain entry. 
They began confiscating ballot boxes and other referendum related material, prompting 
clashes between voters and the Guardia Civil, who used their shields to force crowds back. 
Police have been intimidating and pushing people of all ages and began firing rubber bullets 
at citizens, causing a number of injuries. As various incidents from across Catalonia are 
coming to light, tensions continue to rise, but crowds remain steadfast chanting "we will vote. 
Report further states that citizens tried non-violent protest against the police riot, but police 
“supported by a convoy of riot vans”, started beating people with batons and opened fire with 
rubber bullets. “By midday, at least 38 people have been injured, according to official figures, 
in what Catalan president Carles Puigdemont is calling ‘police brutality’ that ‘will forever 
shame those who justify it.’” Barcelona mayor Ada Colau, in response to mentioned police 
actions, has called for Spanish president Mariano Rajoy's resignation. (Catalan News, 2017g) 
World media published videos and images of riot police raiding polling stations, dragging 
away voters and firing rubber bullets, which, according to media reports, led to almost 900 
injuries on the day of the referendum. World leaders condemned the use of force, and UN had 
called on the Spanish authorities not to interfere “with the fundamental rights to freedom of 
expression, assembly, association, and public participation”, “regardless of the lawfulness of 
the referendum” (Independent, 2017) 
However, the vice president of Spain, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria in her statement on the 
press conference said that “actions were taken against electoral material, never against 
people” and that everything that was done was with the proportion. (Catalan News, 2017h) A 
few days later, The Spanish government has expressed regrets to everyone injured during the 
referendum. (BBC, 2017c) 
6.7.3 Results 
Results showed that 90% of the 2.26 million Catalans who voted on the referendum, voted 
for independence. In total, Catalonia has 5.3 million voters. 770.000 votes were lost because 
of the raid by Spanish police. (The Guardian, 2017b) 
In the following days, Puigdemont declared that Parliament will continue with the plans to 
declare Catalan independence, following the referendum results. Spanish officials, however, 
once again made clear that they do not recognize the vote. "The Spanish National police and 
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the Guardia Civil have fulfilled their duty", said Mariano Rajoy referring to the referendum. 
(Catalan News, 2017i) 
6.7.4 Position of the EU 
The EU supported Spain. In the statement (European Commission, 2017) given on 2 October, 
it is said: 
Under the Spanish Constitution, yesterday's vote in Catalonia was not legal. 
For the European Commission, as President Juncker has reiterated repeatedly, this is an 
internal matter for Spain that has to be dealt with in line with the constitutional order of 
Spain. 
We also reiterate the legal position held by this Commission as well as by its predecessors. If 
a referendum were to be organised in line with the Spanish Constitution it would mean that 
the territory leaving would find itself outside of the European Union. 
Beyond the purely legal aspects of this matter, the Commission believes that these are times 
for unity and stability, not divisiveness and fragmentation. 
We call on all relevant players to now move very swiftly from confrontation to dialogue. 
Violence can never be an instrument in politics. We trust the leadership of Prime Minister 
Mariano Rajoy to manage this difficult process in full respect of the Spanish Constitution and 
of the fundamental rights of citizens enshrined therein. 
 
6.8 Post-referendum events 
Puigdemont tried to find the solution in international mediation and dialogue. Although he 
signed the declaration of independence, as he promised he would do in the case of “yes” 
result, he offered to suspend it for a few weeks, in order to open a period for dialogue. He 
considered that a solution for independent Catalonia can be found as a result of mutual 
respect. (Catalan News, 2017j) However, Rajoy refused any further dialogue, as well as 
mediation, and required Puigdemont to state whether he has declared independence, so that 
the Spanish government can activate Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution. Article 155 
implies the central government’s direct control over Catalonia’s autonomous powers. Rajoy 
explained it that if a region “does not fulfill the obligations imposed upon it by the 
constitution or other laws, or acts in a way that is seriously prejudicial to the general interest 
of Spain”, article 155 will be invoked, and Madrid will take control over Catalonia. (The 
Guardian 2017d) 
Earlier, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, said that the EU 
“cannot get involved” in the Catalan crisis. He stated: “We do not do it because if we do … it 
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will create a lot more chaos in the EU. We cannot do anything. We cannot get involved in 
that.”. (The Guardian, 2017c) 
6.9 Unsuccessful breakaway 
On 27 October 2017, Catalonia unilaterally declared independence from Spain. The 
parliament of Catalonia declared the Catalan Republic with 70 votes in favor, 10 votes 
against and 2 blank ballots. (Al Jazeera, 2017) 
The next day, the central government took control over Catalonia, “dissolved its parliament 
and announced new elections” (The Guardian 2017d). On the press conference, Rajoy said 
that he decided to “call free, clean and legal elections as soon as possible to restore 
democracy “, with the motive to “restore the self-government that has been eliminated by the 
decisions of the Catalan government.” “This is not about suspending autonomy but about 
restoring it”, he concluded. (The Guardian, 2017d) 
World leaders have expressed support for Rajoy's intentions to halt Catalonian independence. 
Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council, tweeted: “For EU nothing changes. 
Spain remains our only interlocutor. I hope the Spanish government favours force of 
argument, not argument of force.” (Tusk, 2017) 
The United States supported Spanish efforts to block Catalan independence. The State 
Department stated that “Catalonia is an integral part of Spain, and the United States supports 
the Spanish government’s constitutional measures to keep Spain strong and united”. (The 
Guardian 2017d) 
The United Kingdom’s position was that “The UK does not and will not recognise the 
unilateral declaration of independence made by the Catalan regional parliament. It is based on 
a vote that was declared illegal by the Spanish courts. We continue to want to see the rule of 
law upheld, the Spanish constitution respected and Spanish unity preserved.” (ibid) 
At this point, it was already clear that Catalan proclaimed independence was not successful.  
The Spanish government took control over the majority of Catalan powers including civil 
services, police, public media and finances, and called regional elections for 21 December 
2017. Spanish prosecutor filed “charges of rebellion again Puigdemont, a crime punishable 
with up to 30 years in prison.” (The Guardian, 2017e)  
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Faced with rebellion charges, Puigdemont leaves Spain for Belgium on 31 October 2017 
(BBC, 2017d). In November 2017, Spain issued a European arrest warrant for Puigdemont 
(and his ministers), seeking for extradition, in order to face charges for „sedition and misuse 
of state funds” (The Guardian, 2017f). Spain’s Supreme Court dropped its international arrest 
warrant in July 2018. However, Spanish warrant remained open, and Puigdemont and his 
ministers will be arrested in case they return to Spain, (Deutsche Welle, 2018) and will face 
trial, like twelve other Catalan officials. Nine out of twelve of them are accused of rebellion, 
and waiting for their verdicts, which are expected in autumn 2019. (The Guardian, 2019) 
In overall, Catalonia’s attempt to become independent was unsuccessful. A strong reaction of 
Madrid, together with lack of support from the international community, broke the hope of 
Catalan people that 2017 will be the year of reestablishing the Catalan Republic. However, 
this does not mean that Catalans gave up their idea. On the contrary, resistance towards 
Madrid will grow, as repression and centralization continue, and when a critical mass is 
created, the institutional struggle might easily be replaced by revolution. In order to prevent 
this, instead of ignoring their requests, Madrid should start the dialogue with Catalan leaders 
regarding the broadest possible autonomy. Such a solution, where both sides would shift from 
their positions, can be a good compromise for resolving the Catalan crisis. But first, as a sign 
of goodwill, Spain should release the Catalan political prisoners.  
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7 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS – CATALONIA AND KOSOVO 
Catalonia and Kosovo - both unilaterally declared independence from their parent states, but 
had utterly different outcomes. In the point-by-point comparison, we will analyze what are 
the similarities and differences between these two cases. 
Parent state 
Both Spain and Serbia are unitary countries, whose constitutions prohibit secession. The two 
countries emphasized indivisibility in their constitutions. Despite this fact, Catalonia and 
Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, breaching national law of the parent state. 
People 
Even though Catalans are considered as a part of the unified Spanish nation, they form a 
separate ethnic group with its distinctive culture, language, and tradition.  Catalonia as an 
entity has a long history, and it was independent in the past. 
On the other hand, Kosovo has never been independent in history. It got autonomy (within 
Serbia) for the first time in 1963. Unlike Catalans, the Albanians already have their national 
state – Albania.  
Relying on the theoretical part of the thesis, neither Catalans nor Kosovo Albanians fulfil the 
criterion for being a “people” in the context of the external right to self-determination. 
Catalans as being part of the unified Spanish nation (Spaniards), and Albanians as a national 
minority in Serbia. However, if we look outside of the formal framework, and compare two 
examples, Catalans would have more historical and political right to secede. 
Referendum 
Although illegal from the perspective of the central government, Catalonia had a referendum 
on independence. Kosovo did not; it declared independence without a plebiscite. 
That is not a formal requirement for exercising the right to self-determination, but it is a 
democratic principle where citizens should be asked and allowed to decide on their future. 
Also, the referendum gives legitimacy to the declaration of independence. 
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Reaction of the parent state 
Comparing these two cases, we can see a firmer reaction of Spain. Although formally, both 
Spain and Serbia annulled declarations of breakaway territories; their courts declared the acts 
of self-governing territories unconstitutional, and raised criminal charges against separatists – 
the situation on the ground was different. Spain sent police to prevent holding the 
referendum, arresting secession leaders, etc. Serbia could not do the same, because it did not 
have effective control over the province.  
Reaction of the international community 
This is the aspect where the most significant difference between the two cases is observed. 
Catalan referendum, and after it - the unilateral secession, were dismissed by the international 
community. The United States said that “Catalonia is an integral part of Spain” (The 
Guardian 2017d) and together with the EU, saw the crisis as an internal issue of Spain, which 
“has to be dealt with in line with the constitutional order of Spain” (European Commission, 
2017). Furthermore, the EU stated, “Beyond the purely legal aspects of this matter, the 
Commission believes that these are times for unity and stability, not divisiveness and 
fragmentation.” (ibid) The UK disregarded the Catalan declaration of independence because 
it is “based on a vote that was declared illegal by the Spanish courts”. (The Guardian 2017d) 
None of this was the case with Kosovo. On the contrary, many countries instantly recognized 
Kosovo as an independent country. Maybe the reaction would be different if Serbia back in 
2008 was a member of the EU. In that scenario, the EU’s interference in internal affairs by 
supporting breakaway territory of a member state would create an internal problem for the 
whole EU, as Juncker suggested for the Catalan case (The Guardian, 2017c) 
Finding 
If we make a conclusion based on the comparison above, and in the light that Kosovo 
relatively successfully break away, while Catalonia did not, one factor is the most dominant, 
and that is the international reaction.  
The diametrically opposite reaction in these two cases of unilateral secession. Before, during, 
and after the referendum and declaration of independence, the international community 
supported Spanish territorial integrity, rather than Catalans in their strives to become 
independent. On the contrary, many countries announced even before the declaration that will 
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recognize Kosovo. Unlike Kosovo, which was instantly recognized by many countries, 
Catalonia was not recognized by any sovereign country after it declared independence in 
2017.  
This hypothesis that international reaction has a key role, is supported by the fact that the 
previous attempt of Kosovo to break away – the declaration of independence in 1991 was not 
successful, it was recognized only by Albania. In this situation, the international reaction was 
missing. 
Another remark emerges at this point, regarding the theoretical standpoint that declarative 
theory of recognition is widely accepted in international law. On these examples, we can see 
the practical application of constitutive theory, by the huge impact which international 
recognition has in contemporary international relations and state creation. 
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8 POTENTIAL BREAKAWAY TERRITORIES IN EUROPE 
There are many active movements for self-determination in Europe. If this trend of 
„balkanization“ continues spreading to the rest of Europe, the map of Europe will change 
dramatically in years to come.  
The most prominent examples of entities looking for external self-determination, besides of 
already mentioned Catalonia, are Scotland, Northern Ireland, Republic of Srpska, Basque 
Country and Flanders. These regions have a high probability of becoming independent 
countries within the next decade. 
8.1 Scotland 
In 2014, Scotland had a referendum on independence, with the consent of the central 
government in the United Kingdom. However, the referendum failed, with insufficient 45% 
of voters supporting independent Scotland. (BBC, 2014) 
After Brexit, a situation might be different. The Scotts voted to remain in the EU, by 62% 
compared to 38% of those who wanted to leave the EU. But the UK as whole voted to leave 
(52% to 48%), „raising the prospect of Scotland being taken out of the EU against its will.“ 
(BBC, 2016) 
At the end of May 2019, Scotland prepared new legislation which should enable a new 
Scottish referendum on independence. The First Minister of Scotland and leader of the 
Scottish National Party, Nicola Sturgeon stated that new voting before 2021 could give 
Scotland “the opportunity to choose to be an independent European nation – rather than have 
a Brexit future imposed upon us”. (Euronews, 2019) 
The Scottish government would like to organize the referendum in the second half of 2020, 
but the final date will be agreed with the central UK government. In regards of legitimizing 
referendum from the Downing Street, Ms Sturgeon stated: „It is essential the UK government 
recognises that it would be a democratic outrage if it seeks to block such a referendum - 
indeed, any such stance would, in my view, prove to be utterly unsustainable.“ (BBC, 2019)  
The question arises what will happen if a new British Prime Minister does not accept the 
Scottish referendum, and whether Scotland, without the consent of London, will anyway go 
for the referendum. 
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8.2 Northern Ireland 
The United Kingdom might pay a high price for leaving the EU, because Northern Ireland 
can follow Scotland’s footsteps and have a referendum. The UK voted to leave in order to 
have, among others, the control over its borders and migrations. Which means when the UK 
leaves the EU, the almost invisible border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland will become hard border, since that is going to be an outer border of the EU. And this 
is where the problem arises. The current border was part of the compromise, which kept the 
peace for 20 years. If the UK establishes hard border with soldiers, customs or walls, in order 
to protect its borders - that could be a huge problem since that border for Irish nationalists 
represented the symbol of British occupation, and would be a violation of the Good Friday 
Agreement which brought peace. Also, we shall have in mind that Northern Ireland as the 
entity voted to stay in the EU. Therefore, the latter reason is the same as Scottish, but unlike 
Scotland which would need to apply for the membership, Northern Ireland would 
automatically become part of the EU in the case of reunification with the Republic of Ireland. 
This scenario is quite realistic, because the Good Friday Agreement (The Northern Ireland 
Peace Agreement, 1998) states, under Constitutional issues part, that British and Irish 
governments will: 
(i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people 
of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the 
Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland; 
(ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the 
two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-
determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to 
bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved 
and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland. 
Therefore, there is an open exit strategy for Northern Ireland. The motive for leaving the UK 
and reuniting with the South, in the case of Northern Ireland is double - nationalistic/religious 
(for Irish nationalists and Catholics), and European (for citizens who want to stay in the EU). 
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8.3 Republic of Srpska 
After the Kosovo case finds its final form, the Republic of Srpska can very easily become 
next hotspot in the Balkans. The Republic of Srpska is one of the two entities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the other being Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbs represents 31% of 
the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina population, with 1.7 million people (Beary, 2011, p. 278) 
Since the Kosovo declaration of independence in 2008, the leaders of the Republic of Srpska 
have threatened to organize a referendum on independence. (ibid, p. 283) In the interview for 
Balkan Insight (2009), a former international administrator in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Matthew Parish, said that „Bosnia’s gradual disintegration would appear inevitable. The only 
question is how the international community will, and should, react to this process.“ (Balkan 
Insight, 2009) 
BBC’s Word-wide Monitoring service survey from 2010 reports that 80% of Bosnian Serbs 
would approve secession and subsequent unification with Serbia (Beary, 2011, p. 283) 
In June 2019, the Serb member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik, 
stated that “there is no freedom for the Serbs in this region without the state”. (Danas, 2019) 
8.4 Catalonia 
Catalonia did not have the strength to unilaterally secede from Spain in 2017, but that does 
not mean they gave up the idea of free, independent Catalan Republic.  
From the first, „non-binding“ referendum, where citizens were answering two questions: „Do 
you want Catalonia to become a State? (Yes/No)“ and  „Do you want this State to be 
independent? (Yes/No)“ (Alcalde & Aguiar,  2017, p. 20) and support of 80,8% of the voters 
for „yes-yes“ option (ibid, p. 21) – to the 2017 referendum where 90% of voters voted for 
independent Catalonia (The Guardian, 2017b), the number of supporters of independent 
Catalan state could only increase in the years to come. 
Puigdemont’s successor on the head of Catalan government, Quim Torra, while visiting 
Scotland in June 2018 for a meeting with Nicola Sturgeon, Scottish First Minister, „has 
insisted he has a strong mandate to push for another independence referendum“ (The 
Guardian, 2018a). Torra stated: „Spain never has an answer to our question: why don’t we do 
something like the Scottish people did? We even tell them: remember that the pro-
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independence side lost in Scotland. Holding a referendum does not mean we are going to 
win.” (ibid) 
In September 2018, a million Catalans gathered on the streets of Barcelona to show their 
support for the independence, and demand the release of imprisoned Catalan leaders. Quim 
Torra once again emphasized that he will continue the struggle for the independent country. 
(The Guardian, 2018b) 
8.5 Basque Country 
Besides Catalonia, many other Spanish regions have separatist aspirations. Basque Country is 
one of the best-known separatist movements in Europe. It has a long history of the struggle to 
independence, including armed conflict from 1959, when the Basque National Liberation 
Movement (ETA) was established, to 2011. (Beary, 2011, p.305) 
Basques are indigenous people in the region which comprises of north-eastern Spain and 
south-western France, and it is known as Basque Country. Basques, just like Catalans, have 
their distinctive language, culture, and tradition. Basque people in Spain enjoy autonomy, 
while Basques in France do not. In Spain, there are 2.1 million Basques, which represents 5% 
of the total population of Spain. (ibid, p. 303) 
In 2003, Juan José Ibarretxe, the Basque Country’s regional premier proposed free 
association state with Spain. Spanish central government rejected that proposal, denouncing it 
a “treason”. (The Guardian, 2003) Requests continued, and after Kosovo declared 
independence from Serbia, the Basques demanded a referendum on independence for October 
2008. The Spanish constitutional court blocked a vote. (Beary, 2011, p. 308) 
ETA, the Basque separatist terrorist group, after a 40-year long period of terrorist attacks, and 
more than 800 deaths caused, announced dissolving its structures in May 2018. (The 
Guardian, 2018c). In that way, a space for peaceful actions was created, and a month later, in 
June 2018, nearly 200.000 Basques protested for their “right to secede from Spain”. (Al 
Jazeera, 2018) 
As the Catalan story goes towards independence, the Basque Country will follow, making it 
harder for Madrid to control the situation on the ground. If Basque Country and Catalonia 
(together with other territories in Spain which want to break away) join their efforts, that 
might ease their struggle for independence. 
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8.6 Flanders 
Flanders represents north part of Belgium, inhabited mostly by Dutch-speaking Flemish 
people. South part of Belgium is French-speaking Wallonia. In Brussels, the capital of 
Flanders and the whole of Belgium, people mostly speak French. This linguistic division is a 
source of all tension between the two major parts of Belgium. 
“From the outset, the francophone minority dominated Belgium. French was the language of 
politics, commerce, and culture, and the capital, Brussels, gradually became a predominantly 
French-speaking city despite being located in Flanders.” (Connolly, 2013, p. 63) 
Wallonia was a dominant and economically stronger part, but after World War II, a situation 
dramatically changed. “Flanders developed a modern economy and emerged as one of the 
wealthiest regions in Europe.” (ibid, p. 64) 
Since the 1970s, self-determination aspirations of the region increased, expanding their level 
of autonomy. Broader autonomy or full independence is the main political goal of the most 
Flemish political parties. (Beary, 2011, p. 318) 
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), the Flemish nationalist party, is the biggest party in both 
Flanders and whole Belgium, advocating separation from Belgium. In 2016, Liesbeth 
Homans, a minister in Flemish government and associate of the N-VA leader, Bart De 
Wever, stated in the interview for the Flemish national broadcaster that she hopes that 
Belgium will not exist in 2025. (Politico, 2016) 
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9 CONCLUSION 
The right to self-determination in the broader sense is a very controversial topic, particularly 
claiming self-determination through unilateral declarations of independence, which was the 
main focus of the thesis. Because these unilateral acts are done without the consent of the 
parent state, secessionist movements often resort to revolutionary and even terrorist methods 
in their struggle for independence, which causes the more brutal response of the central 
government, creating in that way a spiral of violence.  
The most significant impact on the success of these unilateral acts has the political will of the 
most prominent players on the international scene. We could see that in our analysis of two 
case studies – Kosovo and Catalonia. The first one had the support of the majority of the 
international community, while in latter, this support was missing. Neither given criteria were 
relevant, because, in the opinion of the author of this thesis, Catalonia had more political, and 
historical right to secede than Kosovo. However, the author thinks that neither entity had the 
right to secede, but they shall exercise their rights within the parent state, giving them the 
broadest possible autonomy. Besides the legal reason that they do not fulfill the requirements 
given by international law, there is also a philosophical and after all practical, political reason 
for such standpoint. According to the concept of the categorical imperative given by German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant, we shall act in a certain manner only if we think that should 
become a universal law. Therefore, if we think that unilateral secession should become a 
universal right given to everyone, then we should support this principle, in every situation. 
That is a legitimate standpoint. However, it would open the never-ending cycle where every 
region, every community, could proclaim their right to secession. Seen through the light of 
national minorities, exercising this right would mean the disappearance of multi-ethnic 
countries, which represent the essence of today’s Europe. 
Regardless of which of these two viewpoints should be applied, we definitely need a 
universal principle, equally applicable to all. Because we cannot explain why Kosovo 
Albanians, as a national minority in Serbia, had the right to secede from Serbia, and on the 
other hand Kosovo Serbs, as a national minority in Kosovo, cannot secede from Kosovo. 
Double standards and arbitrariness in deciding which territory can, and which cannot secede 
is the biggest problem in this thematic. As we take the Balkan region as an example, the 
inviolability of the borders was guaranteed with many international acts. If, despite this fact, 
we redraw border in one case, how can we expect that such action does not have a reaction? 
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If the border of Serbia can be changed, why cannot be changed the border of Montenegro, 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina? And this is where the greatest danger of such precedent 
lies. If a new Albanian country can be created on the territory of Serbia in the 21st century, it 
is hard to explain why cannot be created another Serb state on the territory of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. To be clear, the author of the thesis has a standpoint that borders should stay as 
they were defined by the Badinter Commission, but the Kosovo precedent consequently leads 
to new borders redrawings. 
With the case of Kosovo, a precedent has been made.  It represents an example of territory 
that relatively successfully seceded from a unitary country. It represents hope for all the 
territories which want to break away. The Kosovo case is proving us that the political will of 
the great powers is stronger than international law, and with a lot of perseverance and support 
of relevant international protector, a territory can achieve its goal. In the case of Kosovo, that 
process took 20 years and it is still not finished. However, this process is now irreversible.  
This precedent could have serious repercussions on Europe in the future. Talking in the 
context of unilateral secession, only in Spain we have several breakaway territories which are 
about to emerge in the near future. Besides of Catalonia, which will continue its struggle for 
the independent Catalan Republic, there are Basque Country, Andalusia, Aragon, Galicia. If 
peaceful secession, with the consent of Spain is not possible, these regions will probably 
resort to various types of civil disobedience, or even armed rebellion.  
The war-torn Balkan region could again be in the focus. After Serbia „accepts the reality“ and 
finds some final compromise with Pristina, a room for the Republic of Srpska will be open.  
Following the analogy, another „reality“ of the de facto state within Bosnia and Herzegovina 
must be accepted too. When Serbs leave Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croats will follow. This 
effect will spread across the region, triggering national minorities to ask for their rights to 
external self-determination, such as Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro; Bosniaks in 
the Sandžak region in Serbia, etc. 
The thesis indicates that unilateral acts cannot be a solution. The solution must be part of the 
comprehensive compromise, which would include interests of all parties, in that way securing 
peace and stability not just in that particular case, but in whole Europe.  
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10 SLOVENIAN ABSTRACT 
Meje v Evropi se spremenijo vsakih nekaj desetletij ali celo v nekaj manj časa. Ta trend se bo 
nadaljeval tudi v prihodnjih letih. Veliko narodov po vsej Evropi si želi svoje pravice do 
samoodločbe, ne glede na to, ali ta želja izvira iz želje po višji ravni in avtonomiji ali po 
neodvisnosti od matične države. Pomen te pravice se je od njene stvaritve dalje spremenil. 
Kar je v začetku bila pravica narodov pod kolonialno oblastjo, danes predstavlja 
kontroverzno vprašanje, brez jasnega okvira in definicij, kdo je do nje upravičen, tj. kaj 
predstavlja "narod", kakšni so pogoji za pridobitev omenjene pravice in kakšen je njen obseg. 
Prav to so vprašanja, na katera bomo skušali v okviru te teze odgovoriti. Glavna tema te teze 
pa bo enostranska razglasitev neodvisnosti, kot način za uveljavljanje pravice do 
samoodločbe in kakšne posledice bi lahko to imelo za Evropo. 
Da bi raziskali omenjene tematike, bomo po kratkem zgodovinskem in teoretičnem ozadju 
tega pojava analizirali študije primerov iz Kosova in Katalonije. Oba primera bomo skušali 
primerjati, ter ugotoviti, zakaj so se mednarodne reakcije obeh primerov razlikovale. Nato se 
bomo osredotočili na žariščne točke prihodnosti znotraj Evrope, ter na subjekte, ki so na poti, 
da v naslednjih desetih letih postanejo države, ter na to, kako lahko ta trend "balkanizacije" 
vpliva na prihodnjo politično pokrajino evropske celine. 
Ta teza bo vsebovala dve glavni raziskovalni vprašanji, ki se obe nanašata na enostransko 
razglasitev neodvisnosti Kosova od Srbije leta 2008. Ti raziskovalni vprašanji sta: 
Ali je primer Kosova precedens za druga ozemlja, ki želijo pridobiti neodvisnost?  
Kakšne so možne posledice kosovskega primera v evropskem kontekstu? 
Ključna ugotovitev te teze je, da je bil primer na Kosovu precedenčni primer. Ta nosi 
globoke in dolgoročne posledice v povezavi s pravico do samoodločbe, kot tak pa bo dvignil 
in vzbudil veliko odcepitvenih gibanj znotraj Evrope. Številna ozemlja, ki so se razglasila za 
države, so primer Kosova uporabila kot precedens za svojo odcepitev. Tako bo tudi v 
prihodnje, saj je na tak način bilo vzpostavljeno neke vrste novo pravilo, vendar pa, kot smo 
lahko videli na katalonskem primeru, to ne velja vedno, marveč je to odvisno od politične 
volje glavnih akterjev mednarodne skupnosti. 
Potrebujemo univerzalno načelo, takšno ali drugačno, ki bo držalo za vse. Ne moremo 
namreč pojasniti, zakaj so se imeli kosovski Albanci kot narodna manjšina v Srbiji pravico 
odcepiti od Srbije, po drugi strani pa se kosovski Srbi, kot narodna manjšina na Kosovu, ne 
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morejo odcepiti od Kosova. Dvojni standardi in arbitrarnost pri odločanju, katero ozemlje se 
lahko, in katero se ne more odcepiti, sta največji težavi v povezavi z omenjeno tematiko. 
Ta precedens bi lahko v prihodnosti imel resne posledice za Evropo. Če se bo ta trend 
enostranskih odcepitev v Evropo še naprej širil, se bo zemljevid Evrope v naslednjih letih 
dramatično spremenil.  
Samo v Španiji imamo več odcepljenih ozemelj, ki se bodo v prihodnosti kmalu pojavila kot 
samostojna enota. Poleg Katalonije, obstaja odprto tudi baskovsko vprašanje, ter vprašanja, ki 
se tičejo Andaluzije, Aragona, Galicije, itd. Če mirna odcepitev s soglasjem Španije ne bo 
mogoča, bodo te regije verjetno uporabile različne vrste civilne neposlušnosti ali se bodo 
poslužile celo oboroženih uporov. 
Najpomembnejši primeri subjektov, ki iščejo zunanje samoodločanje, so poleg Katalonije, ki 
se bo še naprej borila za neodvisno Katalonsko republiko, Škotska, Severna Irska, Republika 
Srbska, Baskija in Flandrija. Za te regije obstaja velika verjetnost, da bodo v naslednjem 
desetletju postale neodvisne države. 
Kot lahko vidimo, lahko omenjen trend secesije po vsej Evropi vodi ne le do politične 
nestabilnosti, marveč tudi do oboroženih spopadov med odcepitvenimi gibanji in osrednjimi 
oblastmi. 
Nobena enostranska dejanja tako ne bi smela predstavljati rešitve. Rešitev mora biti del 
celovitega kompromisa, ki bi vključeval interese vseh strani in tako zagotovil mir in 
stabilnost ne samo v tem določenem primeru, ampak v celotni Evropi.  
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